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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout Asia and the developing world, the pursuit of social
justice through law has become increasingly visible as legal professions
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and legal institutions undergo dramatic changes.' Understanding why and
how lawyers and other advocates mobilize law for social justice has
occupied scholars for the past half century,2 and with the development of
this field of research, attention has increasingly focused on the
relationship between legal practices of lawyers in economically
developed democracies, especially the United States, and lawyers
pursing social justice in societies of the Global South.' In a period
characterized by more intense global contact among societies than ever
before,4 some scholars have focused on the global influence of powerful
governments, international agencies, and private actors committed to
political and economic liberalism imposed from above.' Other scholars
have emphasized the emerging role of lawyers in international
campaigns waged against the inequities of neoliberal development from
In addition to country-specific sources for Asia referred to subsequently in this introduction and
the contributions of other authors to this symposium, acknowledgement of global visibility is
documented in representative recent scholarship. See generally RAISING THE BAR: THE
EMERGING LEGAL PROFESSION IN EAST ASIA (William P. Alford ed., 2007); COURTING SOCIAL
JUSTICE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING
WORLD (Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks eds., 2008); PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN ASIA
(Po Jen Yap & Holning Lau eds., 2011); and THE GLOBAL CLINICAL MOVEMENT: EDUCATING
LAWYERS FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE (Frank S Bloch ed., 2012).
2 Early investigations include: Frances Kahn Zemans, Framework for Analysis of Legal
Mobilization: A Decision-Making Model, 7 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 989 (1982); Mauro
Cappelletti, Vindicating the Public Interest Through the Courts: A Comparativist's Contribution,
in 3 ACCESS TO JUSTICE: EMERGING ISSUES & PERSPECTIVES 513 (Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant
Garth eds., 1979). For recent analysis, see Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, State
Transformation, Globalization, and the Possibilities of Cause Lawyering: An Introduction, in
CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA 3 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds.,
2001); Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court
of India, 4 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 107 (1985); CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
(1998). See also infra Part II.
Scott L. Cummings & Louise Trubek, Globalizing Public Interest Law, 13 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF, 1 (2008); see also ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES (David Nelken & Johannes Feest
eds., 2001). For critique, see Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation
in the Supreme Court ofIndia, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 33 (Neelan
Tiruchelvan & Radhika Coomaraswamy eds., 1987). The term "Global South" is generally
understood to refer to so-called developing societies located primarily, but by no means
exclusively, in the Southern Hemisphere.
See SIDNEY TARROW, THE NEW TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM 8 (2005) (noting the growing
density of international governance and influential international networks among public and
private organizations, businesses, advocates, and other groups); see also ARJUN APPADURAI,
MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (1996) (arguing that media
and migration have greatly intensified contemporary globalization).
See, e.g., FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX
AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Terence C. Halliday, et al. eds., 2007).
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below.' The perspective we put forward in this article acknowledges the
contributions of these scholars, but adopts a different point of departure.
In contrast to those who maintain that legal development reflects
increasing global attention to law and lawyers, we argue that law's
evolving place, especially in the developing societies of the Global
South, arises from the political and social struggles within each society.
Law is defined through political struggles over the role of government,
accountability of the powerful, inequitable effects of social and economic
development, the distribution of status and power, and the everyday
claims for justice of ordinary people, in which lawyers (among others)
have increasingly sought to mobilize law. Law's role, and the role of
lawyers, varies with domestic political development as well as global
influence. Global economies, politics, and resources play an important
part in the emergence of law, but, as we argue in this article, their
influence is mediated by important factors that distinguish societies and
their legal development from each other.
A new generation of scholars studying human rights, social
justice, and rule of law in comparative perspective is making law's
mobilization central to their inquiry by examining how law is perceived,
translated, and deployed in these new global contexts.' Practices making
rights and law active in new contexts do not construct themselves, but as
Jeremy Perelman and Lucie White observe, reflecting on path breaking
collaborative research undertaken with African human rights lawyers,
they are practices "enacted by lawyers and others on the ground."'
Examining the mobilization of law for social change draws attention not
only to the creative strategies of advocates, but also to the contexts in
6 See, e.g., LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY
(Boaventura De Sousa Santos & Cdsar A. Rodriguez-Garavito eds., 2005) [hereinafter LAW AND
GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW].
7 We use the expression "mobilization of law" to refer to ways that law, as a "system of cultural
and symbolic meanings," influences social action. Marc Galanter, The Radiating Effects of
Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT COURTS 117, 127 (Keith 0. Boyum & Lynn Mather
eds., 1983). A rich literature on mobilization of law describes actions that sometimes involve
government officers (such as legislators, court officials or administrative officers) but often
involve only "the initiative of citizens engaged in everyday struggles..." Michael McCann,
Legal Mobilization and Social Reform Movements: Notes on Theory and its Application, in LAW
AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 2, 7 (Michael McCann ed., 2006). We embrace this literature's
emphasis on law's potential autonomy from state authority and its dependence, as a symbolic
resource, on the context in which it is mobilized. See id.
8 Jeremy Perelman & Lucie E. White, Introduction to STONES OF HOPE: HOW AFRICAN
ACTIVISTS RECLAIM HUMAN RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE GLOBAL POVERTY 1, 2 (Lucie E. White &
Jeremy Perelman eds., 2011).
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which their strategies for action and mobilization of law have meaning
and take shape.
Studying the mobilization of law for justice generates a new
perspective on legal development and the globalization of law. Lawyers
for social justice are rare in any society, but they are important. If it is
ultimately the power of law we seek to understand, the experiences of
legal practitioners whose clients are at the margins of society may tell us
as much as the experiences of lawyers for clients with power and
influence. Lawyers for social justice typically lack the resources of
lawyers for "haves." For them, the mobilization of law may be more
difficult and perilous. Nonetheless, they and their clients, for lack of
political alternatives, may be more reliant on the independent force of
law to secure basic protections or opportunities than those of greater
means and social position. For this reason, the comparative study of what
these lawyers do has much to contribute to a better understanding of the
place of law and its development in contemporary societies.
In previous work, two of the authors explored the transfer of
ideas about public interest law practice from the United States to the
Global South, accompanying the spreading influence of capitalism and
free markets.,o They observed that the rule of law movement, embedded
within policies associated with the so-called Washington Consensus,"
has globalized support for economic transformation while also becoming
a resource for groups affected by those same economic and political
transformations-urban workers, rural communities, environmental
stakeholders, and others experiencing the collateral damage of growing
inequality, displacement, and loss of security. While these two sides of
globalization are different, and often in conflict, they are necessarily
linked by the role that rights play in the globalization of markets and
political support for them.
9 Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOc'Y REv. 95 (1974).
1o Symposium, The Globalization of Public Interest Law, 13 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
295 (2008). See Cummings & Trubek, supra note 3, at 10-12.
" The Washington Consensus refers to neoliberal economic development policies emanating from
U.S. foreign policy and pursued by the IMF and World Bank, key elements of which include
fiscal discipline, redirection of public expenditures from direct investment to market
infrastructure, deregulation and tax reform, privatization and security for property rights, and
promotion of trade liberalization and foreign direct investment. See WILLIAM TWINING,
GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 337 (2009).
As explained in Part HIlB, below, these policies have evolved to include strengthening the rule of
law, building civil society capacity, and, as an element of the latter, protections for human rights.
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We now move that earlier analysis forward in two ways. First,
we have chosen an important region for our comparative analysis of
social justice advocacy. Although the growing importance of Asia's
rapid social and economic development has been widely recognized,
relatively few comparative studies examine recent legal developmentl2 or
the rise of the legal profession." With the exception of India and China,
until recently Asian countries have been conspicuously absent from
comparative studies examining the mobilization of law for social
justice.14 Because powerful Western governments and international
agencies perceive legal modernization to be a key factor in economic
development, Asia's growing economic importance alone is a
compelling reason for further study of the evolution of its legal
institutions." Well-publicized controversies over the unequal impact of
economic development, authoritarian governance, religious differences,
and ethnic inequality suggest a few of the reasons why law may be
emerging in struggles for justice.' Yet we know little about when and
why mobilization of law for justice occurs in most Asian societies." Both
similarities and differences among the countries in the region create
opportunities for comparison of important factors such as colonial
history, authoritarian governance, ethnic and religious diversity, and
state-managed development on mobilization of law.
Second, we use this regional focus to develop a framework for
comparative analysis. The importance of comparative analysis follows
n Important exceptions include: FRANK UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN
(1987); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE (2006); RULE BY LAW:
THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds.,
2008); ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Tom
Ginsburg & Albert H.Y. Chen eds., 2009); REGULATION IN ASIA: PUSHING BACK ON
GLOBALIZATION (John Gillespie & Randall Peerenboom eds., 2009).
1' See RAISING THE BAR: THE EMERGING LEGAL PROFESSION IN EAST ASIA, supra note 1. See also
LAWYERS IN THE THIRD WORLD: COMPARATIVE AND DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES (C.J.
Dias et al. eds., 1981).
14 Of the dozens of case studies included in the four volumes edited by Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold which have come to define the term "cause lawyer" only two concern lawyers in
Asia.
'5 David Trubek and Alvaro Santos provide a powerful argument for renewed attention to legal
development, especially in the rapidly developing BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries.
DAVID TRUBEK & ALVARO SANTOS, THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL (2006).
16 See William P. Alford, Introduction to RAISING THE BAR: THE EMERGING LEGAL PROFESSION
IN EAST ASIA, supra note 1, at 4.
'7 Po Jen Yap & Holning Lau, Public Interest Litigation in Asia: An Overview, in PUBLIC
INTEREST LITIGATION IN ASIA supra note 1, at 1.
8 See infra Parts II and III.
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from the great diversity among Asian nations and recognition of the
influence of institutional, political, and global factors on the mobilization
of law. Lawyers mobilizing law for social justice encounter different
opportunities and limits on the power of law in every society. We have
found that a critical difference among societies is the space each allows
for mobilizing support for legal claims. Particular political and
institutional features of a society shape this space. For example, political
openness is one factor influencing the space for mobilizing law. Where
opportunities for political dissent are relatively broad and unobstructed,
mobilizing support for law takes many different forms. Where political
openness is most limited, the mobilization of legal claims often leads
back to the state itself, where lawyers can become creative strategists
within the domain of state power but may also have to negotiate limits on
their social change goals. In this article, we sketch a framework for
comparing the influence of key factors affecting opportunities and
resources for mobilizing law for social justice. We then suggest some
ways in which these domestic factors may also shape the influence of
global support. Our observation is that that the flow of global support for
the rule of law-far from being universally available or uniform in its
purpose or effects-is shaped by the politics of both the sending and
receiving societies, sometimes through limitations imposed by
governments and international agencies, but also by strategic choices and
self-restraint by donors and potential collaborators. 9
Our plan from the outset has been to understand the institutional
and political space for mobilizing law for social justice through
exchanges between practitioners and scholars focused on eleven Asian
countries: Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia,
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The articles in
this issue include a combination of those by scholars of the region, which
provide overviews of important trends and dynamics, and those written
by Asian lawyers themselves, which provide first-hand descriptions of
career origins, critical opportunities and choices, and what the lawyers'
actions were intended to achieve. Both sets of articles address complex,
indirect and subtle influence of culture, politics, and globalization on the
path of legal development-influences more readily discerned after
discussion and reflection among lawyers with deep knowledge gained
through practice in a particular society and scholars with broader
comparative and historical knowledge.
" See infra Part IV.
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The exchanges we encouraged between practitioners and
scholars raise additional questions about the relationship between the
perspectives of these two groups of contributors to this issue. Scholars'
use of first hand narratives as "data" creates a well-recognized risk of
misunderstanding or distorting a narrator's meaning to fit interpretations
conceived in a different institutional context or culture.20 Here, we again
take our lead from White and Perelman's insightful collaborative study
of social justice lawyers in Africa,2 1 which suggests that our concern
need not be whether practitioner narratives created in response to our
ongoing discussions are "authentic"-for practitioners themselves will
acknowledge continuing evolution of their views over the length of a
career, generating many authentic versions with or without discussions
with academics or other members of a global community. Our concern,
like White and Perelman's, and indeed that of the practitioners
themselves, is to better understand the possibilities for law in different
societies and institutional contexts-possibilities about which both the
practitioners and scholars are learning.22 We believe that practitioner
narratives create a unique opportunity to consider the ongoing
reconstruction of spaces within which social justice lawyering occurs and
we make that possibility a central focus of our analysis.23
Part II of this article situates our collaborative project in the
context of research on social justice lawyers. Part III then examines two
challenging issues underlying our comparison of advocacy in Asia:
describing the practices we are comparing and explaining why these
practices are similar or different in each country. For reasons we explain
in detail, we decline to use the familiar concepts "cause lawyer" and
20 See, e.g., Daniel Bonilla, Legal Clinics in the Global North and South: Between Equality and
Subordination, 16 YALE HUM. RIGHTS & DEv. L.J 165 (2013)
21 STONES OF HOPE: How AFRICAN ACTIVISTS RECLAIM HUMAN RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE GLOBAL
POVERTY, supra
note 8.
22 Cummings & Trubek consider whether the local practitioners can accurately assess their ability
to initiate effective social change and whether their power actually owed much more than they
were aware, or could estimate, to globalization. Cummings & Trubek, supra note 3, at 41-42.
23 Our last point raises a final concern. The inherent tendency of academic disciplines to encourage
complexity and contradiction may in some ways be fundamentally at odds with human rights
advocacy, perhaps altering their commitment to a particular objective or strategy. Annelise Riles,
The Virtual Sociality of Rights: The Case of "Women's Rights as Human Rights", in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES: GLOBALIZATION AND POWER DISPARITIES 420 (Michael
Likosky & A.V. Lowe eds., 2001). Although the effects of exchanges between rights advocates
and academics have been a subject of contentious debate, a great deal of the globalization of law
literature accepts the importance of such perspective-developing exchanges about the rule of law,
without, we think paying adequate attention to this issue.
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"public interest law" to describe the practices we are comparing and
instead we focus concretely on how law is being mobilized. Because the
practices typically involve advocacy on behalf of the weak against the
powerful, the success of such practices, whether mobilizing law or
pursuing a different strategy altogether, depends on institutional and
political opportunities and support, both domestic and global. Our point
of entry for comparing how law is mobilized starts with this context. In
Part IV, we suggest that one way to understand variation in the type and
scope of legal mobilization across Asian countries is in relation to two
important domestic factors: political openness and autonomy of law. By
charting the interaction between these two factors, we provide a
comparative framework that maps the domestic space for legal
mobilization. We then suggest some ways that these domestic factors
may interact with global factors influencing the availability of funding
for social justice practitioners. In presenting this comparative framework,
we draw on the contributions to this issue to illustrate its usefulness and
to develop a more nuanced picture based on lessons learned from those
mobilizing law for justice in Asia.
II. LAWYERS FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE
The increasing visibility of lawyers who deploy law for social
justice might be viewed as a natural outgrowth of the geometric rise in
the number of lawyers throughout the economically developing world
over the past thirty years, especially in Asia.24 With the emergence of the
Washington Consensus25 in the 1980s, developing countries have been
pressured to embrace private property, limited government, and free
markets. Lawyers are experts in the rules of this economy. In the last
thirty-five years, even governments that formerly restricted the training
and role of lawyers have begun to encourage development of a legal
profession, and the promise of a career in law in this new international
environment draws aspiring members of an emerging middle class. Yet
lawyers working for social justice are rare in any society, but especially
in developing societies where they face unfavorable odds and, in some
societies, take significant personal risks. Their emergence and career
paths under widely varying conditions across Asia require further
explanation.
24 RAISING THE BAR: THE EMERGING LEGAL PROFESSION IN EAST ASIA, supra note 1.
25 See supra text accompanying note I1.
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Global influence on legal development in Asia predates the late
twentieth century. Colonial governments in Asia imported European
legal institutions-and with them lawyers-adapted to the colonizers'
needs. Other pathways of influence also existed. In the late nineteenth
century, non-colonial Thailand's interaction with European powers
persuaded its monarchs to adopt European-style governmental
administration in order to survive and prosper as a modern nation.
Revolutionary governments in China, Vietnam, and Burma likewise
adapted European models to their purposes to establish socialist
dictatorships. In each of these countries, following the colonial era,
imported institutions have persisted and evolved along paths reflecting
subsequent political history and further international engagement. In the
latter part of the twentieth century, market development-through World
Trade Organization membership, bilateral trade agreements, and the
growth of global finance-has been an important driver of legal
evolution.26
Global economic development has influenced the evolution of
law in each country in other less direct, but important ways. Free markets
and capitalism have greatly increased economic inequality, spawned
contention over natural resources, and created other sources of
dislocation, conflict, and resistance for millions of disadvantaged
members of developing societies in Asia and around the world. Since the
end of the Cold War, these sweeping transformations have had a
powerful influence on the understanding of law in the Global South,
where many believe that law can play a role in promoting, managing, or
resisting the effects of political change and economic development.
Although it has appealed to colonizers and political elites, the rule of law
is also an ideal that has crossed borders for people in the new states of
Asia seeking greater accountability from public or private power holders
or wider opportunities for themselves. In this way, the globalization of
law-including public interest law and human rights-has been
promoted by an influential transnational community of governments,
international organizations, and private agencies with diverse, and
sometimes conflicting, purposes.
Some scholars have argued that the apparent symbiosis between
liberal legality and economic development in Western societies points to
convergence between law in the developing societies of the Global South
26 Nevertheless, the paths of legal and administrative evolution can be quite different. See
REGULATION IN AStA: PUSHING BACK ON GLOBALIZATION, supra note 12, at 16.
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and law in economically dominant societies of the Global North-
notwithstanding their great political and cultural differences.27 One
implication of this view is that the legal profession will inevitably play a
similar role in defense of individual rights and the rule of law in any
society. Yet, the results of efforts to support the rule of law by
international organizations such as the World Bank or the United
Nations, individual global powers such as the United States, and private
foundations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and networks of
activists have been too varied, and often too disappointing, to constitute
an adequate explanation of legal evolution. Much less can these
international efforts entirely explain the roles played by social justice
lawyers, many of whom have little international contact or support for
their work on behalf of indigenous causes.
We think that the evidence suggests a different starting point for
our comparative analysis. In adopting this starting point, we draw on
insights from prior scholarship about lawyers who advocate for social
justice. Research on these lawyers has grown from early studies of
"public interest law" and "cause lawyers" in the United States, and now
extends to exploring the role of law in social struggle in the Global
South. In the United States, public interest law was initially framed as an
effort to provide fuller representation to groups and interests excluded
from traditional politics and the legal system. It was a project in which
lawyers sought to recalibrate the "scales of justice" by leveraging the
law's symbolic power on behalf politically weak and socially marginal
groups.28 Carrying the concept of public interest law and practices
developed in the United States abroad has been fraught with complexity,
encountering challenges based on its inappropriate assumptions about the
institutional and political context of other societies and on resistance to
the imperialism of Global North ideas. In the 1980s, prominent Indian
intellectual Upendra Baxi famously argued against India adopting
"public interest law" as a label for legal rights advocacy, preferring
instead to term it "social action litigation."29 Baxi noted that "while labels
27 See, e.g., William P. Alford, Of Lawyers Lost and Found: Searching for Legal Professionalism
in the People's Republic of China, in RAISING THE BAR: THE EMERGING LEGAL PROFESSION IN
EAST ASIA, supra note 1, 287-310 (contending that by extrapolating European and American
experiences, most American and other foreign observers have seriously misjudged the role
lawyers are likely to play in China's legal change).
28 EPP, supra note 2, at 2-3; Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Law: Facing the Problems of
Maturity, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 417 (2011).
29 Baxi, supra note 2, at 108.
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can be borrowed, history cannot be. [Public interest litigation] represents
for America a distinctive phase of socio-legal development for which
there is no counterpart in India; and the salient characteristics of its birth,
growth, and possibly, decay are also distinctive to American history."30
As Baxi's critique underscores, the term public interest law can
be both a political resource and liability to advocates in other countries.
In the 1970s and 1980s, public interest law carried many positive global
connotations because it was associated with important political struggles
for disadvantaged groups in the United States. The use of law in these
struggles informed advocacy in other countries, such as South Africa.'
However, advocates and commentators also expressed a countervailing
impulse to name the distinct cultural meaning of their own legal
advocacy, as reflected in Baxi's commentary. This effort to both embrace
and avoid the U.S. model suggests what Richard Abel called the "anxiety
of influence."32 Stephen Ellmann, writing about "Third World" cause
lawyering in the early 1990s, makes an equally telling point about
"influence," which is that the focus on U.S. transmission may obscure
the contributions that lawyers in other countries have made to each other
and to the American public interest law movement.33
Ellmann's framing of a "Third World" (a relic of the Cold War)
has now largely been supplanted by talk of the "Global South," a term
generally used to describe poor countries, mostly in the Southern
Hemisphere, working toward different levels of economic development.
Concern over the imperialistic "exportation" of U.S.-style legal
institutions in the postwar era gave rise to the first critiques of law as a
tool for development.34 The current era of development policy, powered
as much by a search for economic as political influence, has reproduced
concerns about the one-sided nature of the relationship between "donor"
and "donee" countries. Colombian legal scholar Daniel Bonilla focuses
on the costs of this relationship in the development of legal clinics. He
argues that many of the North-South exchanges between clinicians are
30 Id.
3' RICHARD L. ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID
1980-1994 (1995).
32 Richard L. Abel, The Globalization of Public Interest Law, 13 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 295, 296-98 (2008).
3 Stephen Ellmann, Cause Lawyering in the Third World, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 349, 358-360 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 1998).
34 See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the
Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REv. 1062 (1974).
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premised on a set of norms that foster subordination rather than
cooperation.3
In part because of the baggage associated with the term public
interest law, scholars Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold 6 coined the
term "cause lawyer" to describe lawyers who practice "with a vision of
the good society."" Their characterization of practitioners who deploy
law in the service of a cause has resonated powerfully not only among
those familiar with the American experience-where lawyers have been
iconic figures in the civil rights and other social movements-but also
those who study and engage in struggles for social justice around the
world. For lawyers and activists outside economically developed
democracies, the link between law and accountability for the powerful or
greater opportunity for the excluded has often made sense as a potential
strategy for advancing human rights and greater distributive justice. For
Sarat and Scheingold, and for many scholars who have followed their
lead, research has focused primarily on lawyers' commitment to causes
compatible with pluralism, democracy, and a liberal legal vision of
justice-causes that are unfamiliar to much of the world.3 8 Their more
recent work has placed less emphasis on democratic values and drawn
3 Bonilla, supra note 20. These norms include the "Production Well," in which "legal academics
from the North is seen as creating original academic products, [while] legal academia from the
South is considered solely as a weak reproduction of knowledge generated in the North;" the
norm of "Protected Geographical Indication," which states that "all knowledge produced in the
North is worthy of respect and recognition per se given the context from which it emerges"; and
the norm of the "Effective Operator," which "indicates that academics from the North are much
better trained to make effective and legitimate use of legal knowledge than academics from the
South."
36 Sarat & Scheingold, State Transformation, Globalization, and the Possibilities of Cause
Lawyering: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA 3, supra
note 2.
3 Id. at 3.
38 In places they have stated this thesis quite broadly: "Generally speaking, there is a natural
affinity between cause lawyering and democratization." Id. at 14. They qualify this bold
assertion with the observation that cause lawyering may be "one of the few avenues open to
those who are subjected to repression." Id. This second phrasing concerns accountability rather
than an ideological embrace of liberal democracy. Scheingold's concluding chapter in the same
volume reaffirms a belief that "democratic aspiration of cause lawyering are manifest and
pervasive," and at the same time admits variation in the vision of democracy held by cause
lawyers in different societies to the extent that some may embrace redistributive goals that are
not characteristic of liberal democracy. Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and Democracy in
Transnational Perspective: A Postscript, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL
ERA, supra note 2, at 383.
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more attention to legal mobilization in illiberal contexts." The important
contribution of Sarat and Scheingold's redirection of the field of study
has been to place at the center of the analysis careful examination of
what lawyers do to mobilize the authority of law and to remind us of the
context-dependence of practice sites, strategies, and cause.
The lawyers on whom we focus in our comparison are distinctive
because their causes and clients are politically weak, unpopular, or
socially marginal. Because they and their clients lack power of their own,
law can be an especially important resource for them. Although they use
many different strategies to advance social justice, lawyers are uniquely
positioned to deploy law to attract support from power holders. As a
symbolic resource, law has power only where it is supported by other
power holders.4 0 Support for law can be derived from powerful
government entities, individuals, private corporations, influential groups,
or a mobilized public. Although lawyers may be motivated by
commitment to a cause, support is needed from power holders, which
"invest" in law to serve purposes of their own.41 In the economically
developed societies of Europe and America, the symbolic power of law
is backed, most importantly, by a powerful profession and powerful
courts, whose mutual support evolved to manage the political fractures
and disputes in a plural society where power is divided among rival
sovereign entities and between public and private institutions.42 In the
United States, where lawyers have become especially influential, the
profession embraces public interest law practice as evidence that it is not
only powerful, but worthy of public trust.43 Public interest lawyers are
supported and often honored by the profession as well as by members of
the public.
In many countries of the Global South, the conditions under
which lawyers mobilize law for social justice are often fundamentally
different. The symbolic power of law is often not secure. As we describe
3 Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do For, and To, Social Movements: An
Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 2006) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold 2006].
40 See generally ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL THEORIES (1968).
4' YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS: LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW OF
EMPIRE (2010).
42 See Richard L. Abel, Speaking Law to Power: Occasions for Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 33,
at 69.
43 See generally STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN:
POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004).
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further, courts may be dominated by the executive branch of government
and lawyers as an organized profession may be weak or have little
commitment to public service." Lawyers who practice for social justice,
and especially lawyers who confront the powerful, may encounter
political and personal risk. Where law itself is weak, constructing the
authority of law and secure sites from which to mobilize law may be the
lawyer's paramount cause.45 For lawyers whose clients are politically
weak or socially marginal, the symbolic power of law, where it exists,
may be especially useful." We emphasize the contingency of law's
power, depending on the context of its deployment, especially the
institutional support for law within the state and the possibilities for
leveraging the power of allies within civil society.
Our task is to understand how the paths of internal legal
development and transnational influence in different societies have
created distinct contexts for mobilization of law for social justice.
Exchanges with our Asian collaborators have shown us that decisions by
individuals also play an important role. The path to becoming a lawyer
who will use law for social justice is guided not only by social
conditions, political institutions, and resources (including global
resources) that enable such a career, but also by experience, reflection,
courage, and choice. Notwithstanding the variety of motivations and
purposes or the odds against success, these extraordinary careers may be
essential first steps toward new possibilities for law.
III. THE CHALLENGE OF COMPARISON IN ASIA
At the heart of Andrew Harding's thought provoking discussion
of legal transplants in South East Asia is the question of whether and
how similar legal practices can become established in societies so
4 Symposium, A Comparative Perspective on Social Justice Lawyering in Asia: Conditions,
Practices, and Possibilities, 31 Wis. INT'L L.J. xxx (2013); see, e.g., Nick Cheesman & Kyaw
Min San, Not Just Defending; Advocating for Law in Myanmar, 31 Wis. INT'L L.J. 702 (2013);
Jothie Rajah & Arun Thiruvengadam, Of Masks, Absences and Exceptions: Cause Lawyering in
Singapore, 30 Wis. INT'L. L.J. 646 (2013).
45 See Cheesman & Kyaw Min San, supra note 44; see also Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 2, at
14.
46 For a similar valorization of law utilized by political outsiders (in response to law's rejection by
the U.S. based Critical Legal Studies movement), see Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-Discrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 1331 (1988); see also Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987).
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strikingly different from the European states where the ideas
originated-and so different from each other. Harding's helpful first step
toward comparison draws on his knowledge of regional history and
culture to identify shared characteristics that may explain some of the
strikingly similar adaptations despite deep political differences. In other
areas, especially development of political and economic institutions, the
societies remain far from Western practice and each other. Harding's
comparison is exemplary because of his knowledge of the region, but
also because he is cautious about generalizations and uses examples of
deeply embedded and locally adapted practices to illustrate how ideas
and practices, regardless of origin, take on meaning as law in a new
setting.
Like Harding, we seek to understand why some practices and
strategies for mobilizing the law are shared across Asia while others are
not. Lawyers for the politically weak are particularly dependent on
support from others for social change strategies and for legal
mobilization in particular, and we begin by identifying similarities and
differences among these societies, which we think will be closely
associated with the sources of support for law. Similarities include those
described by Harding, and we discuss their relevance for mobilizing law.
We then consider other factors that recent comparative research has
suggested are central to the mobilization of law for social justice and
which distinguish these societies from each other.
Harding identifies several important historical and cultural
commonalities that have influenced the role of law-including roots in
early transplantation of ideas about law from Hindu, Buddhist,
Confucian, and Taoist thought-which share an emphasis on the "wider
family as the natural unit of society, and their placement of community
above the individual: all of which have profound implications for law."47
Ethnic diversity and minority inclusiveness are important sources of
conflict in virtually all Asian societies and affect the emergence of law as
a resource for social justice. Harding also suggests that the very syncretic
nature of legal adaptations, at different times from different non-
European and European jurisprudence, in which systems of thought have
combined or adapted to distinct conditions rather than superseding
previous concepts of law, might also be a regional characteristic. While
47 Andrew Harding, Comparative Law and Legal Transplantation in South East Asia, in
ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 199, 213-15 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001).
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there are similar conceptions of rights in some areas, syncretic adaptation
has preserved unique and eclectic characteristics of legal development.
More directly related to our interest in the process by which law
may be mobilized, colonization and adaptation to politically and
economically powerful nations in the twentieth century has resulted in
other shared experiences, including rapid economic growth. Many Asian
countries have also struggled to integrate an eclectic mix of institutional
forms derived from indigenous, European, and American models.
Harding notes, notwithstanding different paths for political development,
an apparent preference for semi-authoritarian forms of governance
throughout the region.
The conditions under which the modem governments of Asian
states were formed set them apart from Europe, whether or not they
originated from colonization.4 8 An important consequence of elite or
colonial imposition of modem government has been that legal systems
have been shaped to serve rulers' needs rather than serving a political
accommodation between rulers and subjects.49 A profoundly important
effect of top-down legal development in many modem Asian states has
been the formation of a "statist" or executive branch judiciary, which
lacks the institutional independence familiar to lawyers in democracies in
Europe or North America. 0 Indeed, one purpose of statist governments
48 Relatively late development of colonized and non-colonized states alike within a system
dominated by European powers meant that new states had far less freedom to create new
institutional forms adapted to indigenous political needs or demands. Instead, a powerful
international community required formation of governments patterned on models that evolved
historically in Europe which were then established in Asia either by colonizers or by indigenous
elites seeking recognition and support from the powerful community of nations. CHARLES TILLY,
COERCION, CAPITAL AND EUROPEAN STATES, AD 990-1992 (1992). The establishment of
socialist governments following revolutions has likewise been influenced by the European
experience.
49 Modern Asian states typically developed from the top down. Lev contrasts European legal
development where rule of law was a political bargain struck by governments with new
contenders for political power, especially an emerging commercial class with economic capital
needed by the state. DANIEL S. LEV, Introduction, in LEGAL EVOLUTION AND POLITICAL
AUTHORITY IN INDONESIA: SELECTED ESSAYS 3 (2000). Abstract principles for rule of law
institutions have rationalized and legitimated these political bargains. Frank Upham has argued
that an idealized form of this theory, derived from European and North American experience, has
become the rule of law "orthodoxy" prescribed by the Washington Consensus as a necessary
precondition for economic development. Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law
Orthodoxy, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 75 (Thomas
Carothers ed., 2006).
* Kanishka Jayasuriya, Corporatism and Judicial Independence Within Statist Legal Institutions
in East Asia, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA: THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 147 (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 1999) [hereinafter Corporatism and Judicial
Independence].
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has been to manage development of a relatively undeveloped private
sector." Further, as Daniel Lev has observed, the absence in Asian legal
thought of any equivalent to the natural law tradition in European and
American jurisprudence provides little foundation for a rule of law which
limits the state's political will.52 Statist courts and statist jurisprudence, as
well as a tendency toward semi-authoritarian government, have meant
that lawyers pursuing social justice in most Asian societies have
sometimes developed strategies which require little support from the
judiciary and at other times have used litigation strategically to draw
support for other strategies or even to press for increased judicial
autonomy.
Further, South East Asian countries have recognized themselves
as a community through a regional accord, the Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN)," and especially relevant to our inquiry, have
adopted ASEAN's common front on human rights.54 The emergence of
stable semi-authoritarian regimes has given rise to contentious debate
about the universality of human rights norms promulgated by
international agencies and supported by states and NGOs of the Global
North. These differences in perspective on the meaning of rights have
acquired added importance because of the economic success of their
state-managed economies. The "new developmental states"" of Asia and
5 Jayasuriya explains that the judiciary is not viewed as a separate branch of government. Instead,
the judiciary is a part of the executive, guided by the same mission rather than the mission of
maintaining the public-private divide to keep an overreaching executive in check and to facilitate
orderly private interactions. Id. at 177-81.
52 LEV, supra note 49, at 6.
53 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN (Nov. 20, 2007),
http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-charter/asean-charter.
5 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, ASEAN (Feb. 28, 2013),
http://www.asean.org/resources/publications/asean-publications/item/asean-human-rights-
declaration-ahrd3.
5 In 2001, Harding concluded that "[i]n Asia ... the notion of the 'Asian developmental (or
regulatory) state,' characterized by social stability, authoritarian governmental structures ... and
long-term economic planning, is now seen by many as crucial to the understanding of law-and-
development in Asia." Harding, supra note 47, at 202.David Trubek's description of the legal
policies of Asian developmental states makes clear that "innovation" in industrial policy is the
key to their economic success. An important implication is these states, on economic as well as
political and cultural grounds, may be hostile to the concept of entitlements that are
commonplace in welfare states and to a lesser degree in neo-liberal conceptions of the state.
Trubek maintains that, on the contrary, the states pursuing the new political economy of
development [NPED] see social protection programs of poverty and inequality reduction to their
benefit. David M. Trubek, Developmental States and the Legal Order: Towards a New Political
Economy of Development and Law (Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 1075, Paper No. 1075, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1349163.
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Latin America are resisting neoliberal prescriptions, giving additional
credibility to statist institutions and state-managed development. The
dominating economic success of China and "Asian Tigers" not only
considerably alters the conventional wisdom about the value of western,
neoliberal rule of law "orthodoxy" and convergence, but may be
legitimating an alternative paradigm for successful development in which
law plays a different role."6 How the emergence of a "third moment"" in
the relationship between law and development shapes legal mobilization
for social justice, and the role of lawyers, is a compelling question for
comparative study. The varied reception of liberal legalism and
neoliberal economic prescriptions favored by the United States and its
global partners, the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and
leading foundations raises still broader questions about the impact of
other forms of global connection that are even more clearly related to
advocacy for social justice-including the role of international venues,
such as the United Nations or the International Bar Association Human
Rights Institute, or the influence of networks, NGOs, and an array of
potential global partners.
Because of broadly similar cultural and political influences,
advocates for justice across many countries in the region may encounter
similar conflicts arising from such issues as ethnic or religious difference
and exclusion, arbitrary exercise of power under authoritarian
governments, or resistance to post-colonial development and global
economic hegemony. At times, advocates may find it useful to employ a
regional or international discourse about human rights, law, and injustice.
However, the practices associated with establishing sites and developing
strategies for mobilizing the law take shape under profoundly different
conditions. Domestic politics and global influence have propelled each
country's institutional development along different paths. Colonial era
"investment" in law by a society's elites has been a particularly
important part of this story in many Asian states." The paths of
subsequent legal development, even among societies colonized by the
same European country, have been radically different. New
constituencies are becoming active, making political claims and
56 Id
s7 David Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development
Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 15, at 1, 4.
56 DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 41.
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demanding accountability, and transnational influence is penetrating
domestic political space in new and significant ways.
Studies of the evolution of law in Asia emphasize the
fundamental importance of the relationship between political authority
and legal development." Four recent comparative studies refine this
general observation by making lawyers and the conditions under which
they mobilize the law their point of entry. We conclude that each study
provides only a partial view of the influence of context on the
mobilization of law. Drawing on all four, together with the contributors
to this issue, we identify two domestic factors associated with important
differences and similarities in patterns of legal mobilization for justice.
The next part of the article develops a framework combining the two
factors and examines its implications.
Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth's comparative study of seven
former Asian colonies emphasizes the importance of elite "investment"
in the autonomy of law from the colonial era to the present time,
especially investment by lawyers possessing social, economic, or cultural
"capital" to support their elite standing.60 Where early investment was
substantial and sustained over time (as in India or the Philippines), law
and the legal profession have remained relatively autonomous. Where
domestic elites failed to make such an investment, the autonomy of law
has been greatly reduced (as in Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Singapore),
and thus of limited use for opposing an authoritarian government-
unless lawyers receive support from elite global sponsors (as in
Indonesia). Dezalay and Garth's research provides valuable descriptions
of the actions of elites in former colonies, but their general argument
applies to non-colonial states as well. Limited early investment in law's
autonomy from political rulers in countries such as Thailand and China
has had a profound effect on the subsequent development of law and its
relative autonomy (or lack of autonomy) from the central political
authority of the state.' In the late 1980s, investment by indigenous elites
in institutional reform in Mongolia and Bangladesh changed the path of
5 Harding, supra note 47; RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
(Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008); see also LEV, supra note 49.
6 DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 41. Their study includes Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea.
61 RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW (2002); DAVID M.
ENGEL, LAW AND KINGSHIP IN THAILAND DURING THE REIGN OF KING CHULALONGKORN
(1975); TAMARA LooS, SUBJECT SIAM: FAMILY, LAW AND COLONIAL MODERNITY IN THAILAND
(2006).
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legal development, supporting both a sharp turn toward democracy and a
potential for greater autonomy of law.6 2
Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito
show, in contrast to Dezalay and Garth, how social justice lawyering in
the Global South has arisen "from below," supported by a "subaltern
cosmopolitan legal consciousness" and through the efforts of progressive
networks that extend both across borders and from civil society into
government." Case studies by Santos, Rodriguez-Garavito, and other
scholars illustrate the growing importance of transnational collaborations
to pressure multinational corporations and domestic regimes to respond
to the concerns of less powerful groups and comply with international
human rights norms.64 Studies in this collection also suggest rich
possibilities for effective action "from below" to defend rights or change
policies by nonelite lawyers who find collaborators in civil society and
within the government itself-even in the most authoritarian states." The
perspective of Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito resonates with the
literature on social movements and "history from below" emphasizing
the importance of political opportunities and resources available for
collective action against the state.66
62 See infra notes 100-101, 130-131 and accompanying text.
63 LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW, supra note 6. "Subaltern cosmopolitan legality" is an
approach to the study of law which "aims to empirically document experiences of resistance,
assess their potential to subvert hegemonic institutions and ideologies, and learn from their
capacity to offer alternatives to the latter." Id at 14-15.
6 Additional examples of transborder movements leveraging NAFTA's framework can be found
in the symposium organized and edited by Scott Cummings & Louise Trubek. See Cummings &
Trubek, supra note 3. The potential influence of Transnational Activists Networks (TANS) is
described in classic studies by Kathryn Sikink and her colleagues. MARGARET E. KECK &
KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1998); THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC
CHANGE (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999).
65 Examples include Duean Wongsa, TRAFCORD and Its Participation in the Promotion of
Human Rights to Counter Human Trafficking in Thailand, 31 WIS. INT'L L. J. 501 (2013)
(describing network collaboration between an NGO and government); John Gillespie, The
Juridification of Cause Advocacy in Socialist Asia: Vietnam as a Case Study, 31 WIS. INT'L L.J.
672 (2013) (advocacy for a community deploying symbolic capital gained as former government
official) [hereinafter The Juridification of Cause Advocacy in Socialist Asia]; Cynthia Farid, new
Paths to Justice: A Tale of Social Justice Lawyering in Bangladesh, 31 WIS. INT'L. L.J. 421
(2013) (illustrating the important role of bar association leaders and law school faculty); Arvind
Narrain & Arun Thiruvengadam, Social Justice Lawyering and the Meaning of Indian
Constiutionalism: A Case Study of the Alternative Law Forum, 31 WIS. INT'L. L. J. 525 (2013)
(emphasizing the importance of collaboration with social movements).
6 See Sidney Tarrow, States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements, in
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING
STRUCTURES AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS 41 (Doug McAdam et al. eds., 1996).
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Terence Halliday, Lucien Karpik, and Malcolm Feeley compare
the evolution of political and legal liberalism in former British colonies
(including Malaysia, India, and Singapore)." They and their
collaborators focus on the capacity of courts and the organized bar to
remain autonomous following the end of British colonization and
establishment of authoritarian governments. Key political transitions in
each country have restructured the relationship between the political
regime and legal institutions. Taking differences in the courts and bar as
a starting point, their case studies describe variations in direct state
control of the judiciary, doctrinal barriers that limit access to the courts,
and restrictions on the independence of the legal profession." Tracing the
"fate" of liberal institutions, the authors do not consider processes of
legal mobilization as such, or the growing influence of international
movements for rights and the rule of law. Yet their case studies
underscore the importance of the bar and courts, and the role of social
movements that influence the mobilization of law and the strategic
choices lawyers must make.69
Sarat and Scheingold's influential work on cause lawyering
contributes a fourth important comparative perspective."o
Conceptualization of "cause lawyers" as practitioners who further "a
67 See Terence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik, Political Liberalism in the British Post-Colony: A
Theme with Three Variations, in FATES OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM IN THE BRITISH POST-
COLONY: THE POLITICS OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX 3 (Terence Halliday et al. eds., 2012)
[hereinafter FATES OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM IN THE BRITISH POST-COLONY]. Asian countries
in this study include India, Malaysia, Singapore, and Pakistan.
6 Thus, while Dezalay and Garth emphasize the sociological process by which a significant group
of elites invests lesser or greater amounts of social, economic and political capital in the
autonomy of legal institutions (and describe subsequent political events which affect the value of
this capital), Halliday, Karpik and Feeley take the outcome of this process as their starting point,
examining the evolution of liberal ideals under political arrangements vastly different from
Britain's. Santos and Rodriquez-Garavito, like Dezalay and Garth, describe opportunities and
strategic choices that led to legal cases, made careers, and, collectively, established the character
of legal institution. Halliday, Karpik and Feeley's more conventional political history focuses on
the effects of authoritarianism which have undermined liberal ideals and defined points of
conflict.
6 In a different context, the globalization of financial reforms, Halliday has persuasively shown
that the outcome of legal transplantation depends on the stakes of institutional players at the
receiving end who transform new laws and legal practices to reinforce existing roles and
relationships. See Terence Halliday, Architects of the State: International Organizations and the
Reconstruction ofStates in East Asia, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 265 (2012).
70 CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra
note 33; CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 2; THE WORLDS
CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 2005); see also Sarat & Scheingold 2006, supra note 39.
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vision of the good society"" has encouraged detailed case studies of their
advocacy. These studies have explored the specific conditions under
which lawyers' careers take shape, law is deployed as a political
resource, sites of practice are constructed, and possibilities for change
emerge.7 Among the most important conditions for cause lawyering
identified by Sarat and Scheingold are the political limitations and
openings created by the state. Surveying the research, they conclude that
"the strategy, tactics, recruitment, reproduction, and organization of
cause lawyers-as well as relationships between cause lawyers and
mainstream professionals" must constantly adjust to "the changing
configurations of state power."" Globalization of law is a second
important factor influencing cause lawyering. Notwithstanding the
influence of the rule of law as an element of neoliberal economic
development promoted "from above," they conclude that the rule of law
"from below" also creates new openings for lawyers challenging the
state. This is because law necessarily "decenters national legal orders,
bringing them into stark juxtapositions, bringing new forces to bear in
contestation over legal rules and practices, bringing new patterns of
power as legal life gets rearranged."74
Because these comparative projects were undertaken with
different goals in mind, they emphasize different contextual factors that
influence how law can be mobilized and with what success. Dezalay and
Garth, like Halliday and his collaborators, describe the role of lawyers in
relation to specific types of institutions. These two studies are focused
primarily on the relation between the evolving influence of the state and
the capacity to mobilize law, but differ in the attention they give to
specific institutions and actors in that process-elite lawyers, bar
associations, courts, social movements, or global power holders. In
contrast, Santos and Garavito (like Sarat and Scheingold) are more
interested in the mobilization of law as a process than in the evolving
state context. Because they focus on mobilization, they pay more
attention to the support for mobilizing law in the advocates' immediate
context, including social movements, recruitment of lower level officials,
NGOs, transnational activist networks, and other forms of global
71 See Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 36 and accompanying text.
72 Sarat & Scheingold 2006, supra note 39, at 10.
7 Id. at 12.
74 Id. at 14.
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support." Their projects view the global movement for rule of law as
complex and multilayered, rather than an elite-driven process, and
discuss the influence it has had in ways not envisioned by some of its
most powerful global sponsors.
Together, these studies provide starting points for development
of a descriptive and analytical framework for comparing mobilization of
law in different countries. By seeking to explain when and how law can
be mobilized strategically as a political resource, each study illuminates
important aspects of the role of institutions, opportunities, and resources
in supporting or limiting the law's role. We draw three conclusions from
these studies that are developed further in the next section. First, the
capacity to mobilize law as a political resource is closely connected to
the independence of legal institutions and the bar. Second, the
relationship between legal mobilization and the capacity for political
dissent is critical. These two domestic factors interact in ways that
produce variation across time and space. They also are shaped by global
forces. Santos and Rodriguez emphasize that social movements, and
especially global movements, provide alternatives to domestic political
support for legal mobilization. Similarly, Sarat and Scheingold argue that
interaction between a state's legal institutions, globalization, and social
movements may create new openings for cause lawyering. As this
research highlights, a third important factor shaping legal mobilization is
the role of global connections. The influence of globalization has been
particularly complex, in part because global actors have different motives
and offer different resources, and in part because global support is
influenced by the domestic space for legal mobilization. The next section
provides an initial mapping of these complex relationships.
IV. A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK
In this part, we draw from the contributions to this issue and the
broader comparative literature to suggest a framework for understanding
differences and similarities in the mobilization of law across Asian
states. This framework is an effort to facilitate analysis of the domestic
and global factors shaping different avenues for and types of legal
mobilization for justice. It seeks to do two things. First, we identify two
7s Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito, Law, politics, and the subaltern in
counter-hegemonic globalization, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW, supra note 6.
76 id.
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broad domestic factors-autonomy of law and political openness-
which we suggest may help to illuminate why and how lawyers mobilize
law for social justice in different ways in different contexts. Next, we use
these factors to explore the opportunities and limitations that shape legal
mobilization across the region and how they may influence particular
sites and strategies in each country. We then consider how these
domestic factors may interact with global ones to influence the
availability and type of funding for social justice work. At each stage of
our analysis, we emphasize that the framework we propose is intended to
be a starting point for deeper examination and refinement of our
understanding of mobilization of law across the region and that our
conclusions are preliminary and tentative.
A. MAPPING DOMESTIC SPACE FOR MOBILIZING LAW
1. Autonomy ofLaw and Political Openness
Building on contributions to this issue and the larger body of
comparative scholarship, we begin by suggesting two factors that
influence the domestic space for mobilizing law. The first may be termed
the autonomy of law," by which we mean the degree to which law can be
mobilized through agencies of the state, for example courts, to challenge
those with political power." Dezalay and Garth suggest that the greatest
threat to legal autonomy is the power of authoritarian governments over
courts and the legal profession. Similarly, Halliday, Karpik, and Feeley's
examination of former British colonies shows that the principal threats to
n The importance of autonomy more generally may be a complex issue. Autonomy of law has
special importance for claimants of rights who lack financial resources and access to political
leaders, but statist judiciaries, described earlier, may perform some judicial functions more
effectively in a "developmental state" precisely because they lack a degree of autonomy. See
also John Gillespie, Rethinking the Role ofJudicial Independence in Socialist-Transforming East
Asia, 56 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 837 (2007).
7 It may be asked why we have not begun by considering whether the legislative and executive
branches respect the autonomy of law, which is the liberal democratic ideal. But while this may
seem a self-evident starting point, we are especially interested in how lawyers mobilize law to
support the aspirations of clients, political or otherwise. Lawyers do this in distinctive ways,
through their special knowledge of legal process and legal ideology. As we discover when we
combine our two factors, below, the most favorable conditions under which courts and bar are
independent and political space is open to mobilizing dissent occur in democracies. We have
chosen to emphasize conditions permitting mobilization rather than the institutions that these
conditions reinforce. While democracies may be relatively easy to identify and characterize, the
regimes in Groups II through I below are less easily labeled and the factors on which we focus
are a more useful guide to the prospects for social justice lawyers.
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legal liberalism are limitations imposed on (and by means of) the courts
and organized profession that entrench dominant political interests. Both
studies remind us that the factors influencing legal autonomy are
complex and context-specific. Legal autonomy is influenced by the
relationship among different types of courts, the organized bar, and law
schools. It is also shaped by the degree to which law is structurally
protected and widely implemented. Thus, one would suspect that law is
less autonomous in contexts in which it is easy to change constitutional
and statutory provisions or where lower level government officials have
broad discretion over policy implementation. On the other hand, local
discretion may also provide opportunities for lawyers to influence local
decision makers-and may place those decision makers in a position of
exercising power to support social justice causes. Illustrating this point,
Santos and Garavito-Rodriguez emphasize the possibilities for exploiting
the decentralization of state power to advance movements, while some
case studies assembled by Sarat and Scheingold describe what might be
termed "cause bureaucrats" as well as "cause lawyers.""
Studies on the autonomy of law have placed greatest emphasis
on the accessibility and responsiveness of the courts. Courts dominated
by the political interests of the executive and legislative branches have
been more hostile to attempts to mobilize law for social justice than
courts that are relatively autonomous from political domination. We have
already described the generally statist orientation of the bureaucratized
judiciaries in many Asian countries. More authoritarian political leaders
have relied on a variety of direct and indirect means of influence over
judges. For example, control of bureaucratic appointments and
advancement has created judiciaries with less autonomy in Indonesia and
Malaysia." In these and other states, executive power has been
reinforced through legislative interventions to limit judicial review of
executive power, by constitutional amendment, or (in the most extreme
cases) through direct political pressure on judges."' In some Asian legal
" See Neta Ziv, Cause Lawyers, Clients, and the State: Congress as a Forum for Cause
Lawyering during the Enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act, in CAUSE LAWYERING
AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 211.
80 In some countries, bias introduced through bureaucratic appointment has been augmented by
ethnic preferences. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 41, at 96; Shanmuga Kanesalingham,
Monkey in a Wig: LoyarBurok, UndiMsia!, Public Interest Litigation and Beyond, 31 Wis. Int'l.
L.J. 586 (2013).
8' Corporatism and Judicial Independence, supra note 50 (describing judicial appointments in
Singapore); Cheesman & Kyaw Min San, supra note 44 (describing direct influence on judges in
pre-reform Myanmar).
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systems, an important consequence of judicial subservience to the
interests of the executive branch has been the development of
jurisprudence restricting access to courts.82
Members of the legal profession are licensed by the state, and
subject to state supervision, but they are also private actors with a degree
of independence from the state. Notwithstanding the limited autonomy of
the courts in many countries, the legal profession has preserved a degree
of independence in some Asian states through its elite social status,
superior education, relation to an international community of wealthy
clients, and training (often abroad) in a rule of law legal ideology.83 Each
of these factors helps to explain the readiness of the legal profession in
some countries with statist judiciaries and an authoritarian government to
embrace litigation and alternatives to litigation for mobilizing law to
promote social justice when there are opportunities.'
The second broad factor that we suggest influences the domestic
space for mobilizing law may be termed political openness, by which we
generally refer to opportunities to mobilize dissent outside of legal
institutions. Such opportunities relate to a complex web of factors, which
include the existence and strength of domestic civil society actors, and
the degree and severity of governmental repression. As other scholars
have long noted, the power of organizations, movements, and individuals
to oppose the government through politics has a direct relationship to
their capacity to mobilize law for social change.8 ' A strong environment
of openness may both provide more resources for, but make less
necessary, legal mobilization. In these contexts, law may be used to
complement political strategies to strengthen their overall impact. On the
other hand, a weak environment may channel political grievances into
courts, but still imperil the lawyers who advance them if they overstep
political bounds. Here, law may be used in more subtle ways to push the
limits of authoritarianism by exposing inconsistencies between legality
and practice, or to negotiate solutions to local problems.
82 Malcolm Feeley, Judge and Company: Court, Constitutionalism, and the Legal Complex, in
FATES OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM IN THE BRITISH POST-COLONY, supra note 67, at 493.
8 No assumption is made about the nature of the rule of law ideology embraced by social justice
lawyers. Rule of law is an ideal constructed by practice, and as experience has shown, takes
many different forms, promoting many different kinds of fundamental values and institutions.
See Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, supra note 49; see also Frank Munger, The
Cause Lawyer's Cause, 28 LAw IN CONTEXT 95 (2010) (Austl.).
84 See Part JV.A.ii; Scott L. Cummings, The Pursuit of Legal Rights-and Beyond, 59 UCLA L.
REv. 506 (2012).
5 See id. (reviewing the U.S. literature).
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The case studies assembled by Sarat and Scheingold, and by
Santos and Rodriquez-Garavito provide many illustrations of law
mobilized for political goals with the support of NGOs, domestic
political groups, social movements, transnational activist networks, and
social and public media. In general, where civil society is strong, support
for mobilizing law for social justice can come from many different
sources, and will be shaped by both the opportunities created by local
politics and institutions, and by direct and indirect government
interventions to limit dissent."6 Direct limitations can include regulation
of private organizations (including registration, taxation, and monitoring
requirements as well as control of domestic and international sources of
funding)," licensing and monitoring of public media, and control of
assemblies, demonstrations, and other uses of public space." Indirect or
informal controls include arbitrary use of bureaucratic and police
authority as well as harassment or intimidation that can take any number
of forms." Under the most repressive regimes, a government may resort
to arrest, prosecution, or imprisonment of lawyers who have challenged
its authority."
In our framework, interaction between autonomy of law and
political openness creates a space in which social justice advocates
encounter distinctive constraints and opportunities. The point we make
here is that these constraints and opportunities may have distinctive
patterns that allow us to better compare social justice practice across
Asian states. We emphasize that each factor is itself in reality a
shorthand for a complex set of ideas and institutions-and also influence
one another. Because of this, we also emphasize that each factor should
86 Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 2. Sarat and Scheingold's observation is supported by a well-
developed body of social movement research. See COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL
FRAMINGS, supra note 66.
87 Authoritarian governments especially exercise discretion unchecked by law associated with state
funding as well as licensing or registration requirements. See, e.g., Gillian Koh & Ooi Giok Ling,
Relationship between State and Civil Society in Singapore: Clarifying the Concepts, Assessing
the Ground, in CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 184 (Lee Hock Guan ed., 2004); see also
MARK SIDEL, LAW AND SOCIETY IN VIETNAM: THE TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 141-165 (2008).
8 See, e.g., Kanesalingham, supra note 80.
89 See, e.g., MEREDITH L. WEISS, PROTEST AND POSSIBILITIES: CIVIL SOCIETY AND COALITIONS
FOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN MALAYSIA 124 (2006); see infra notes 159-161 and accompanying
text.
9 Cheesman & Kyaw Min San, supra note 44; See also China Human Rights Briefings: Chinese
Authorities Resort to Violence Against Human Rights Defenders, CHINESE HUMAN RIGHTS
DEFENDERS (May 14, 2013, 4:23 PM), http://chrdnet.com/2013/05/7768/.
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be understood as a continuum with many intermediate stages between the
extremes that contribute to significant variations in practice. Our modest
claim here is that, although each factor simplifies a complex reality,
taken together they nonetheless help orient comparative analysis of the
broad structural features of domestic politics that powerfully influence
legal mobilization. We use it as a starting point to guide deeper
investigation of the similarities and differences we observe in legal
mobilization in the eleven countries examined in this issue.
Figure 1 charts the relationship between autonomy of law and
political openness, and tentatively assigns countries in this issue to
relevant quadrants. Because each dimension is complex, the placement
of each country is only intended to suggest a starting point from which to
examine distinctions within each quadrant and differences from countries
in others. We emphasize at the outset that, although the countries in each
quadrant have important similarities, there are also differences that
matter for lawyers' advocacy strategies. Figure 1 is thus meant to provide
a way of thinking about differentiating conditions for lawyers in order to
help guide further examination, comparison, and refinement.
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2. Contexts for Mobilization ofLaw: A Tentative Comparison
This section explains our initial placement of countries within
specific quadrants, together with our qualifications and reservations, and
suggests implications of each location for legal mobilization. Our
analysis draws on both detailed country studies and comparative research
undertaken by other scholars bearing on political openness and autonomy
of law.' The goal of this exercise is not to overstate similarities or reify
differences, but rather to offer a starting point that will lead to deeper
understanding of factors influencing legal mobilization.
Quadrant 1 is comprised of countries that have had some success
building both autonomy of law and political openness-India, the
Philippines, Bangladesh, and Thailand-although there are important
differences.92 India and the Philippines are relatively secure democracies
9 Several other scholars have described a roughly defined, and similar, continuum of divergent
political and legal development in Asian states from those where political freedom and use of
law to challenge political authority is most confined (Myanmar, Singapore, Vietnam, China), to
an intermediate transitional group of authoritarian states with active civil societies (such as
Indonesia and Malaysia), to governments closest to being fuilly democratic (India, Philippines,
and perhaps Thailand). See Harding, supra note 47; Randolf S. David, Political Space: Lessons
from Southeast Asia, in BREAKING THROUGH: POLITICAL SPACE FOR ADVOCACY IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA 13 (Joel Paredes et al. eds., 2007). Mongolia and Bangladesh are not discussed by any of
the comparative studies we have reviewed. Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth reach similar
conclusions by a different route, describing India and the Philippines as states where the
autonomy of law has become established and Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong as states
where the autonomy of law has failed. We agree as to Singapore, but we follow Harding and
Whiting in taking a different view of Malaysia because of its vibrant civil society and activist
bar. Andrew Harding & Amanda Whiting, "Custodians of Civil Liberties and Justice in
Malaysia": The Malaysian Bar and the Moderate State, in FATES OF POLITICAL LBERALISM IN
THE BRITISH POST-COLONY, supra note 67, at 247. A third group of states has been described by
Harding and by Dezalay and Garth as transitional (Indonesia, South Korea, and we add Malaysia
and Mongolia). See Harding, supra note 47, at 214; DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 41, at 258-
60. Dezalay and Garth's classification of these states is based on the role of sponsorship for
social justice lawyers by global law firms. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 41, at 258-60. Ours
is grounded in a large literature on the rising tide of activism in countries like Indonesia and
Malaysia which supports legal activism independent of a global elite. We argue that our
categories capture the valuable insights from the comparative studies and incorporate them into a
broader analysis of differences and potential developments through legal activism.
92 Dezalay and Garth conclude that lawyers India and the Philippines have the capacity to confront
authoritarian governments because of a history of investment in the autonomy of law. DEZALAY
& GARTH, supra note 41. Halliday, Karpik and Feeley concur in characterizing India as the most
"liberal" of the former British colonies. Halliday et al., supra note 67; Feeley, supra note 82.
Andrew Harding likewise characterizes India and the Philippines as "democratic" and tentatively
adds Thailand to his list. Harding, supra note 47.
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with relatively strong protections for political dissent. They also both
have strong traditions of bench and bar independence. The high courts of
India and the Philippines have long demonstrated their autonomy by
rendering important constitutional rulings against governmental abuse of
rights." In both places, there is a support structure of lawyers litigating
rights and employing other strategies to advance social justice practice in
law firms, NGOs, or networks of legal services offices.94 Some elite law
schools teach and train new lawyers to serve the interests of the broader
public through legal clinics.95 None of these attributes guarantees
problem-free mobilization of law or easy victory, but lawyers are able at
a minimum to mobilize the law through courts for their causes.
We add Bangladesh and Thailand to this list, but they are
different from India and the Philippines in important respects.
Democracy in both Thailand and Bangladesh is fragile, and recent
governments, authoritarian and otherwise, have placed some limits on
political activity." In Bangladesh, legal autonomy factors are present,
9 See Epp, supra note 2; Rohit De, Emasculating the Executive: The Federal Court and Civil
Liberties in Late Colonial India: 1942-1944, in FATES OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM IN THE
BRITISH POST-COLONY, supra note 67, at 59. See also Harry L. Roque, The Call of The Times:
Strategic Public Interest Lawyering During The Arroyo Regime In The Philippines (2001-2010),
31 WIS. INT'L L.J. 462 (2013).
9 See Narrain & Thiruvengadam, supra note 65 (giving a brief history of the rise and fall of PIL in
India); see also Roque, supra note 93 (describing successful constitutional litigation over a
period of years in the Philippines).
9 Aubrey McCutcheon, University Legal Aid Clinics: A Growing International Presence with
ManifoldBenefits, in MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE LAW-RELATED WORK OF FORD
FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND THE WORLD 267, 277 (Mary McClymont & Stephen Golub
eds., 2000), available at
http://equalbeforethelaw.org/sites/default/files/library/2000%2Many/2ORoads%20to%20Justic
e.pdf.
96 Further, the risk of violence directed against human rights activists or political opponents of the
current regime is far larger in these two countries. Odhikar, Human Rights Monitoring Report,
ODHIKAR.ORG (June 1, 2012), http://www.odhikar.org/documents/2013/HRR_2013/human-
rights-monitoring-monthly-report-may-2013-eng.pdf. Odhikar is a Bangladesh human rights
organization which publishes an annual summary of the status of human rights in Bangladesh.
See About Odhikar, ODHIKAR.ORG, http://odhikar.org/about-us/about-odhikar/ (last visited Jan.
16, 2014); Archive: Annual Human Rights Report, http://odhikar.org/category/reports/annual/
(last visited Jan. 16, 2014). On political violence in Thailand, see World Report: Thailand 2012,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-thailand
(last visited Feb. 14, 2014). On political space for dissent in Bangladesh, see, e.g., Saleem
Samad, Political Squall Stalls Bangladesh Development Projects, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/176/32020.html (last visited Jan. 15,
2014). Thailand's lkse majesti and computer crimes laws have been used to limit access to the
media for political dissent through criminal prosecutions of some activists. On recent restrictions
on political space in Thailand see generally DAVID STRECKFUSS, TRUTH ON TRIAL IN
THAILAND: DEFAMATION, TREASON, AND LtSE-MAJESTt (2011); SAWATREE SUKSRI ET AL.,
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though weaker than in India or the Philippines. The Supreme Court of
Bangladesh has enforced constitutional mandates to check government
abuse of rights. Since the late 1980s, the Bar Association and the
Supreme Court have formed a strong, mutually supportive bloc
independent from political domination by authoritarian rulers." Older
members of the legal profession, many with elite training in England or
Russia, have maintained political independence, becoming law
professors and leaders of the NGO movement. With respect to political
openness, Bangladesh has had relatively free elections and a two party
system for several decades, and a working democracy. A large and active
NGO community, supported primarily by foreign funding, provides
infrastructure for a civil society and contributes information and
expertise needed for public participation in politics."
Thailand also has significant limits on legal autonomy. Judicial
independence in Thailand is in its early stages. Throughout its history, a
tradition of conservative, statist jurisprudence limited use of the courts
for social justice advocacy and reinforced the political marginality of the
legal profession.99 The establishment of administrative courts in Thailand
in 2000 has changed this picture.' 0 A small but increasing number of
public interest litigators have won significant constitutional and statutory
victories on behalf of social causes."' While lawyers mobilizing law for
social justice have formed networks to provide mentoring and support,
they remain a distinctive minority."2 The profession as a whole lacks
power and does not embrace mobilizing law for public interest causes.
COMPUTER CRIME? IMPACT OF THE COMPUTER-RELATED CRIME ACT OF 2007 AND STATE
POLICIES ON THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION (2012) available at http://www.boell-
southeastasia.org/sites/default/files/computercrimepublication-thai.pdf
9 Cynthia Farid, New Paths to Justice: A Tale ofSocial Justice Lawyering in Bangladesh, 31 WIs.
INT'L L.J. 421 (2013).
98 Overview ofNGOs and Civil Society: Bangladesh (Aug. 2008), ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2008/CSB-BAN.pdf (last visited July 31, 2013).
Farhat Tasnim, Civil Society in Bangladesh: Vibrant but not Vigilant (2007) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Taskuba), available at
http://www.tulips.tsukuba.ac.jp/limedio/dlam/B27/B2782934/l.pdf.
9 See Wongsa, supra note 65.
1on Peter Leyland, The Emergence of Administrative Justice in Thailand Under the 1997
Constitution, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 230.
101 See, e.g., Bangkok Pundit, Thai Court Uphold Suspension of Industrial Projects, ASIAN
CORRESPONDENT (Dec. 3, 2009, 7:30 AM), http://asiancorrespondent.coi/25821/thai-court-
upholds-suspension-of-industrial-projects-part-/.
102 Frank Munger, Globalization, Investing in Law, and the Careers of Lawyers for Social Causes:
Taking on Rights in Thailand, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 745 (2008-2009).
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With regard to political openness, legal restrictions limiting some forms
of expression in Thailand, occasional limits on mobilization, and
violence directed against some activists in both Bangladesh and Thailand
have not deterred emergence of community and NGO-based collective
action for both local causes and causes linked to global networks of
support. 0 3
Quadrant 2 includes countries with relatively limited legal
autonomy but increasingly vibrant civil societies reflecting greater
political openness: Indonesia, Malaysia," and Mongolia.'o
Authoritarian governments and a preference for state management of key
resources and services are characteristics shared with the "new
developmental state."'06 Each of these states is in political transition and
thus lawyers pursuing social justice seem to have increasing resources
and space for their work.
Indonesia's complex blend of traditional and European legal
institutions were quickly subordinated to the control of the authoritarian
governments that followed independence after World War II."o7 With
Suharto's resignation in 1998, following the collapse of the Indonesian
economy during the Asian fiscal crisis, the repressive institutions under
his rule were dismantled, but even under Reformasi, subsequent leaders
have struggled to establish democratic governance and more responsive
courts.o8 Lack of judicial training, corruption, and political influence
continue to constrain the independence of the judicial system. "I Limiting
103 Michael Connors, Ambivalent About Human Rights: Thai Democracy, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
ASIA 103 (Thomas Davis & Brian Galligan eds., 2011); Stephen Golub, From the Village to the
University: Legal Activism in Bangladesh, in MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE LAW-RELATED
WORK OF FORD FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 95, at 127.
" See Harding & Whiting, supra note 91; see also WEISS, supra note 89.
os5 Tom Ginsburg, Nationalism, Elites, and Mongolia's Rapid Transformation, in MONGOLIA IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: LANDLOCKED COSMOPOLITAN 247 (Stephen Kotkin & Bruce A.
Elleman eds., 1999); Jargalsaikhan Mendee, Civil Society in a Non-Western Setting: Civil
Society in Mongolia (July, 2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia),
available at
https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/42779/ubc_2012 fall jargalsaikhan mendee.pdfseq
uence=1.
106 See Trubek, supra note 55. Other states in Trubek's category include China and perhaps
Vietnam, but neither of these countries has permitted political openness to the same degree as
these three.
07 Daniel Lev, Judicial Institutions and Legal Culture in Indonesia, in CULTURE AND POLITICS IN
INDONESIA 246 (Claire Holt ed., 2d prtg. 1977).
o08 See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 41, at 119-125.
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the progress of reforms is an influential establishment empowered under
Suharto's New Order and entrenched as leaders of government
bureaucracies, the military, and the corporate economy."o A small group
of elite lawyers founded the Legal Aid Institute in 1971, which provided
legal support for opponents of the authoritarian regime and became a
leading advocate for the rule of law. Since its founding, the Institute has
provided crucial mentorship to subsequent generations of Indonesian
activist organizers and lawyers."' Its importance has grown, as a source
of leadership and of new leaders, as Indonesian civil society
organizations have begun to flourish."2
Malaysia's judiciary, although better trained than Indonesia's,
has long been under executive and legislative control."' The British
constitutional settlement of Malaysia left the government in the control
of a Malay minority, which has exercised its power by means of a single,
dominant party since independence.14 A large Chinese minority,
prominent in the business community, has been all but excluded from
politics. The government has kept tight control of the media, and state of
emergency orders issued in 1957, during an uprising long since crushed,
gave the government broad powers to suppress its opponents and any
public dissent."' Only the Internet has remained free from regulation
no Edward Aspinall, Indonesia: Transformation of Civil Society and Democratic Breakthrough, in
CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN ASIA: EXPANDING AND CONTRACTING DEMOCRATIC
SPACE 61 (Muthiah Alagappa ed., 2004). Further limiting progress toward observing basic
human rights, the United States considered Indonesia an important second theater in the war on
terror, encouraging an increase in government capacity to monitor and control the activities of
suspected terrorists and reducing concern about violating human rights. Michele Ford,
International Networks and Human Rights in Indonesia, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA, supra note
103, at 38.
As Sukarno's dictatorship fell in the mid-i 960s, a small group of elite anti-authoritarian lawyers
founded PERADIN, the Indonesia Advocates Association, which kept alive the ideals of
independent courts and legal profession. PERADIN eventually sponsored the Legal Aid
Institute, which in turn has become a key to preservation and replication of social justice
lawyering in Indonesia. Daniel Lev, A Tale of Two Legal Professions: Lawyers and the State in
Malaysia and Indonesia, in RAISING THE BAR: THE EMERGING LEGAL PROFESSION IN EAST
ASIA, supra note 1, at 383.
112 In the early 1990s, as Suharto's political grip began to give way in response to massive
demonstrations against brutal government suppression of protests, and increasing after his fall in
1998, Indonesian civil society emerged as an active social force, able to bring pressure for
change. There have been an increasing number of organizations linked to the labor movement,
women's rights NGOs, human rights of ethnic minorities and other social causes, many linked to
international networks and donors. See Ford, supra note 110.
113 See Lev, supra note I11.
114 See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 41, at 93-94.
"' For examples, see WEISS, supra note 89, at 124. See also Kanesalingham, supra note 80.
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and, as a result, Malaysia's NGOs and social movement organizations
have used it to create an audience, disseminate their activities, and to
mobilize support. A major political victory for opposition parties in
2008, which limited the Malay party's control of Parliament, has been
widely attributed to increasingly effective mobilization of political
opposition by use of the Internet."'6 In 2011, a coalition of human rights
and other organizations succeeded in pressuring the government to
withdraw its emergency orders, a movement that included high profile
(via the Internet) litigation brought by social justice lawyers on behalf of
detainees. '
The Malaysian legal profession illustrates an important point
about the status of lawyers-subject to state authority and
simultaneously capable of becoming independent political actors. The
bar, made up of elite, foreign-trained lawyers serving corporate clients,
most ethnically Indian, has remained independent and a strong advocate
for the rule of law, even though the courts offer limited access for
political challenges and the profession itself has lacked political
influence."' The legal profession has played an important role in
supporting NGOs, exploiting access to the Internet to raise legal issues
which challenge the government's authority and-as the courts have
become more open since 2000-employing litigation in support of
broader political campaigns.
Mongolia's abandonment in 1990 of its long history of
communist and authoritarian government to become a parliamentary
democracy has also created a terrain of rapid legal and political change.
While Mongolia's transition to democracy is widely viewed as
successful, based in part on its ability to conduct "free and fair
elections,""' the rapid transformation is the result of elite consensus
rather than restructuring in response to demands from below.12 0 As a
116 Kanesalingham, supra note 80.
" Id; Tsun Hang Tey, Public Interest Litigation In Malaysia: Executive Control and Careful
Negotiation of the Frontiers OfJudicial Review, in PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN ASIA, supra
note 1, at 80, 90-93.
118 Today, the bar is much more diverse, but remains independent and unified in its support for the
rule of law. The Malaysian Bar currently has more than 14,000 attorneys (or about a 1/2000
attomeys/population ratio, compared with 1/350 in the US). Statistics-No. ofLawyers and Law
Firms, MALAYSIAN BAR,
http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/statistics no of lawyersand law firms.html (last visited Jan.
16, 2014).
"9 SUSAN V. LAWRENCE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41867, MONGOLIA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS,
(2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41867.pdf.
120 See Ginsburg, supra note 105.
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consequence, the government remains highly centralized. Mongolia's
politics have been influenced by corruption with the rise of global
interest in its natural resources.'2 1 Parties in power have used their
position to invoke the law for reprisal against opponents, and civil
society organizations challenging policies of the government are thus at
risk. Nonetheless, Mongolia is relatively more open than the strongly
authoritarian countries discussed below. NGOs participating in politics
or asserting rights against the government typically seek political
sponsorship from one of the major political parties.'22
Mongolia's institutional support for autonomy of law, however,
is relatively weak. The judiciary, lacking training or experience in
independence, and with few incentives to explore greater autonomy, has
been increasingly controlled by the executive.'23 Mongolia's legal
profession, like its judiciary, has little experience of independence or
training in a rule of law tradition on which to build its role.'24
Our placement of Singapore as the only country Quadrant 3 may
be controversial. Singapore's government has severely limited political
space for dissent or even nonconformity.'25 Yet its record with respect to
autonomy of law is quite complex. Although its judiciary and legal
profession have been described by some commentators as lacking
autonomy, Singapore consistently ranks among the leaders in judicial
professionalism and rule of law.'26 Jayasuriya refers to these contrasting
qualities as "dual legality," meaning adherence to the rule of law for
most civil and criminal matters, but-by contrast-adherence to the
government's restrictive interpretations of political or civil rights, which
limit activities that run counter to the policies of the dominant one-party
121 See Mendee, supra note 105, at 7, 14. Mongolia's Global Transparency score has fallen
precipitously as has its World Bank rule of law score.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 The number of lawyers is very small, about 1250 lawyers in a population of 2.7 million (or
about one lawyer for every 2200 persons, compared with 1/350 for the US). More significantly,
the bar association is a private non-profit organization, but it is the same organization which
existed under previously authoritarian governments and membership is apparently compulsory.
See Information Sheet-Mongolia, JAPAN FED'N OF BAR ASS'NS (Nov 10, 2011),
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/bar-association/word/data/Mongolia.pdf (last visited Jan.
16,2014).
125 Corporatism and Judicial Independence, supra note 50; see also Jothie Rajah, Lawyers,
Politics, and Publics: State Management of Lawyers and Legitimacy in Singapore, in FATES OF
POLITICAL LIBERALISM IN THE BRITISH POST-COLONY, supra note 67, at 149.
126 See, for example, the World Bank's Rule of Law index which places Singapore at the highest
level. Singapore, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, http://worldjusticeproject.org/country/singapore (last
visited Jan. 16, 2014).
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state or threaten domestic political stability.'27 Jayasuriya also
distinguishes Singapore's judiciary from other statist judiciaries because
of its professionalism and the absence of overt manipulation of its
decisions by the government.'28 Instead, conformity with the
government's repressive political control is maintained, he argues,
through a high degree of political self-regulation.'29 Internalization of a
jurisprudence which conforms to the political expectations of
Singapore's ruling party has been encouraged by selective appointment
of bureaucrats to judicial positions, short-term rotations between
bureaucratic and judicial positions, and occasional removal of judges
from the bench after a disapproved decision.'o More surprising, perhaps,
is the absence of overt resistance to authoritarian government by
members of the bar, who are equally self-regulating, though not
universally so."' Lawyers who assist NGOs and other groups interested
in policy or political change seldom play a public role,'32 while lawyers
who have directly challenged the government have been rare, and in the
past, such incidents have drawn swift repression and reprisal."'
Thus, in many ways Singapore's situation resembles societies in
Quadrant 4. Yet there are reasons to think that change may occur along a
different path from other highly authoritarian societies. 3 4 Some area
specialists view the high regard in which the judiciary of Singapore is
held by the international community in economic matters and its
simultaneous failure to embrace substantive political ideals associated
with rule of law as an inherently unstable situation, which places the
Singaporean judiciary in a unique position of vulnerability to symbolic
resistance in the name of rule of law ideals."' As discussed below, the
27 Kanishka Jayasuriya, Introduction: A Framework for the Analysis of Legal Institutions in East
Asia, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA: THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS,
supra note 50, at 1.
128 Corporatism and Judicial Independence, supra note 50.
129 Id.
130 id.
131 Rajah & Thiruvengadam, supra note 44.
132 See Lynette Chua, Pragmatic Resistance, Law and Social Movements in Authoritarian States:
The Case of Gay Collective Action in Singapore, 46 LAW & SOC'Y. REV. 713 (2012).
133 JOTHIE RAiAH, AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW: LEGISLATION, DISCOURSE AND LEGITIMACY IN
SINGAPORE (2012).
134 Others have viewed the space for mobilizing political dissent in Singapore as an area of active
negotiation and change in which the state has gradually adopted a somewhat more liberal policy.
See Koh & Ling, supra note 87, at 186-188.
1' See Garry Rodan, Political accountability and human rights in Singapore, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
ASIA, supra note 103, at 70.
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reputation of Singapore for adherence to the rule of law has created space
for some dissident lawyering and may create other openings for change
that do not exist, for example, in more closed societies."'
China, Vietnam,"' and Myanmar"' occupy Quadrant 4: countries
having nominally socialist legal ideologies (but with great variation in
practice) and authoritarian governments correlated with weak legal
autonomy and closed political space. These states different significantly
from those in Quadrant 1-but differ from each other as well. As a
matter of ideology, socialist legality reinforces the subservience of the
judiciary to the executive,"' in ways that have important implications for
legal development and social justice lawyers. China and Vietnam have
been termed "socialist market states," 40 which are now confronting
challenges arising from setting narrow boundaries for political openness
while creating ever widening economic and technological links to an
international community. Although socialism creates common ground,
China and Vietnam's rapid emergence as market societies may soon
place them closer to Singapore by creating tensions between their need
for a modern judiciary and desire to maintain control of opposition to
state policies and state authority.141 Until 2010, Myanmar was ruled by a
military junta with limited capacity for effective governance and which
employed direct political manipulation of the judiciary and reprisals
against dissidents and their lawyers 42 to suppress almost all political or
social cause mobilization. 43 Because Myanmar has never been governed
by a principled or effective socialist government, neither its legal system
under dictators and the junta nor its recent progress toward reform has
involved the carefully controlled introduction of reforms to support an
increasingly market-oriented economy that is apparent in China and
136 See Rajah & Thiruvengadam, supra note 44. Thus, because Singapore is highly regarded as a
commercial center and is strongly motivated to maintain its "first world" status, Singapore may
have created conditions under which the contradictions of dual legality maximize the potential
for liberal change.
1 See The Juridification of Cause Advocacy in Socialist Asia, supra note 65; see also SIDEL, supra
note 87.
138 Cheesman & Kyaw Min San, supra note 44.
139 See Corporatism and Judicial Independence, supra note 50.
' See David, supra note 91.
141 See RACHEL E. STERN, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION IN CHINA: A STUDY IN POLITICAL
AMBIVALENCE (2013).
142 See Cheesman & Kyaw Min San, supra note 44.
143 See VINCENT BOUDREAU, RESISTING DICTATORSHIP: REPRESSION AND PROTEST IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA (2004); Andrew McGregor, Human Rights Coalitions in Myanmar, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
ASIA, supra note 103, at 144.
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Vietnam. Although Myanmar has recently moved toward greater
openness, it is far behind and has a long legacy of ineffective governance
and destructive political repression to overcome.
Although "socialist legality" subordinates formal law to socialist
ideology and to party interpretations or policy,'" there are also many
practical limitations on judicial independence in China. Although
China's court system is complex, having many levels and territorial
jurisdictions covering a vast geographic expanse, it is a system designed
to maximize interaction between policy making branches, the courts, and
political supervision, ultimately under party control.'45 The subtlety of
this system of control allows political leaders to use the courts for
purposes of indirect control, punishing rule of law violations by
subordinate officials accused of corruption or rights violations while
creating an instrument of political control capable of keeping conflicts
from reaching higher levels of government.'46 Courts have become an
avenue for social justice advocacy in rare cases, but far more often
provide no remedy against policies of the central government.'47 The very
complexity of the system has meant that at the margin, social justice
lawyers may occasionally win in administrative courts,'48 or general
courts,'49 but victories require special conditions where other resources
are brought into play.o The practice of law as a private profession was
reintroduced in both China and Vietnam in the 1980s in response to
4 The contradiction of judicial autonomy under socialist legality has been described as similar to
serving two masters. The courts are subservient to the law and also to the socialist principles
underlying the law. Even in cases where the written law is relatively clear, party implementation
commands supreme respect as the peoples' interpretation of socialist principles underlying the
law. SIDEL, supra note 87.
Corporatism and Judicial Independence, supra note 50, at 193-197.
146 Ben Liebman, Lawyers, Legal Aid, and Legitimacy in China, in RAISING THE BAR: THE
EMERGING LEGAL PROFESSION IN EAST ASIA, supra note 1, at 311-356.
147 Mary Gallagher, 'Use the Law as Your Weapon!': Institutional Change and Legal Mobilization
in China, in ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY, AND POSSIBILITIES FOR JUSTICE 54
(Neil J. Diamant et al. eds., 2005).
1 John W. Givens, Sleeping With Dragons? Politically Embedded Lawyers Suing the Chinese
State, 312013 WIS. INT'L L. J. 734 (2013).
49 Gallagher, supra note 147.
"o In China, important recent scholarship has suggested that social change may be advanced on
issues such as environmental reform through implementation by local officials attempting to
synchronize reform with other important political objectives, like economic growth and social
stability. See Alex Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and
Bureaucracy in China, 37 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 365 (2013).
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growing engagement with the global economy."' In neither country are
professional associations independent of the government.'52 Lawyers who
challenge the state's ideology or politics in either China or Vietnam have
been subject to severe reprisal as are organizations considered to be
troublesome or a threat."' Unregistered organizations may be subjected
to harassment through frequent inspections, tax audits, and other forms
of bureaucratic pressure or policing.'54 Sites of social justice practice
which are directly controlled by the state, such as law school clinics or
state controlled mass organizations, may be the most secure places for
lawyers challenging state policies."'
Political space in both China and Vietnam is closely controlled
through state ownership of the media, and the Internet is also closely
controlled. Use of public space is subject to state control as well. While
unions, legal aid, and other organizations serve some public legal needs,
and for this reason their lawyers might be characterized as lawyers
pursuing social justice, many such organizations are state controlled and
their mission limited."' Some NGOs are supported by the state,
addressing social issues in a way that is compatible with that support."'
Other NGOs, which have external support, have been required to register
and their external sources of support must likewise be registered."'
In 1962, Myanmar's government was taken over by military
leaders with a professed socialist ideology. With the exception of a brief
period of liberalization in 1988, a repressive military junta has carefully
controlled the courts and political participation.' 9 In 2009, the junta
signaled significant progress toward a "discipline democracy," which
151 SIDEL, supra note 87; Givens, supra note 148. The number of lawyers in China exceeds 190,000
(about 1/7900 citizens). THOMAS LUM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22663, U.S. ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS IN CHINA (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22663.pdf. In 2008,
Sidel reported that Vietnam had about 8500 lawyers (about 1/10,000 citizens). SIDEL, supra note
87.
152 The Juridification of Cause Advocacy in Socialist Asia, supra note 65.
' Id.; LUM, supra note 148.
' China Pledges to Allow Nonprofits to Play a Greater Role, PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIGEST (Mar.
15, 2013), http://www.philanthropynewsdigest.org/news/china-pledges-to-allow-nonprofits-to-
play-greater-role.
15 Titi Liu, Transmission of Public Interest Law: A Chinese Case Study, 13 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 263, 278-83 (2008).
156 Id.
15 Id.
s8 See Gillian Wong, China Says it Will Give Nonprofits a Greater Role, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar.
13, 2013, 6:43 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/china-says-it-will-give-nonprofits-greater-role.
See also infra Part V.
'5 BOUDREAU, supra note 143.
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established Parliamentary rule under military leadership and in 2011 the
ruling military council dissolved itself, turning governance over to a
nominally civilian government.'60 Since 2009, civil society has begun to
reemerge and relationships with other nations have begun to be
restored,'"' but while extreme and arbitrary authoritarian rule may be
ending, many of the junta's institutions and practices have left their
imprint on political participation and the legal system. Civil society has
been greatly weakened by decades of effective suppression of political
dissent,'62 but the recent change of direction by the ruling junta has
restored party politics and relaxed formal limitations on political space.
NGOs have begun to emerge as conduits for new ways of thinking and
acting politically.'
Under the junta, decisions of the court system in cases the
government deemed important were corrupted by direct political
manipulation." The domestically trained judiciary had few ideological
resources and little incentive to resist political pressure. Trials were
frequently closed to the public and state controlled media do not report
them. Private law practice was never banned, but lawyers who
represented those charged with crimes against the state often faced
reprisal, served jail terms, and had their licenses revoked.' 5 Myanmar's
legal institutions remain formally the same, but with the political
opening since 2010 it remains to be seen how mobilization of law will
change now that practitioners no longer fear being jailed, public media
has been allowed to report what courts do, and there is more democratic
participation in government.
16 MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42939, U.S. SANCTIONS ON BURMA: ISSUES
FOR THE 113TH CONGRESS (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42939.pdf
161 Bart Gaens, Political Change in Myanmar: Filtering the Murky Waters of "Disciplined
Democracy" 13, 21-22 (Finnish Inst. Int'l Affairs, Working Paper No. 78, 2013), available at
http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/313/.
162 Boudreau describes student groups and other activists trying to organize and coordinate the mass
uprising in 1988 but so lacking in experience as protesters that a great amount of time was lost
relearning lessons known to earlier generations of activists about mobilizing public support and
effective coordination. See BOUDREAU, supra note 143.
163 Aung Hla Tun, Myanmar Junta Makes Way for Civilian Government, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2011,
9:11 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/30/us-myanmar-politics-
idUSTRE72T20720110330.
64 Cheesman & Kyaw Min San, supra note 44.
165 id.
392
Mobilizing Law for Justice in Asia
3. Preliminary Evidence: Patterns ofLegal Mobilization in Asia
In this section we examine the usefulness of the framework we
have constructed to capture patterns of interaction between legal
autonomy and political openness. We have thus far described some of the
differences among the countries represented in this issue and situated
them in a comparative mapping. Here we draw on evidence from the
articles in this issue to ask whether our preliminary mapping illuminates
patterns of legal mobilization across the countries represented. Our
approach is to consider what the framework suggests about the patterns
of legal mobilization across countries and then to compare the evidence
we have from our collaborators' articles. We emphasize that legal
autonomy and political space are not static concepts, but instead are
constantly in motion and interactive. In reality, they constitute one
another, and in part through their interaction, each is subject to political
contest and reinterpretation. We attempt to refine our understanding of
this interaction through our collaborators' descriptions of mobilizing
politics to achieve greater autonomy of law and mobilizing law to
achieve greater political openness. We are also deeply interested in the
variety and creativity of the contributors' individual responses to the
opportunities or constraints they have encountered within each country.
Where legal autonomy and political openness are both high-
Quadrant 1-we expect to see multifaceted social justice strategies,
where law is not prioritized, but used as leverage to advance causes in
connection with other forms of political pressure. That is, legal
mobilization under conditions of autonomy and openness would look
beyond litigation in court-but not leave it behind. Similarly, because
institutional development is already strong, the goals of legal
mobilization would move beyond building the rule of law (though this
would remain important and constantly be at stake) to ultimately focus
on using law to more directly redress specific social problems. Here
timing may matter: political openness may occur first, creating space for
building law's autonomy-or vice versa. Once both are built up, then
they come to be viewed as different tools of politics, with neither
privileged. In each country, there are efforts to move law to this point of
minimal autonomy-so there is a project of building judicial
independence that may precede or at least occur simultaneously with the
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move to legal empowerment, alternative law, and multifaceted strategies.
That is one hypothesis.
What do the contributors to this issue tell us about this
hypothesis? We see at least some evidence in support. The first part of
the story that Cynthia Farid tells about Bangladesh is one of how the
judiciary comes to play a larger role in politics.'66 Elite lawyers initially
exert power through politics, a new constitution is passed that creates
resources for judicial independence, and then litigation works to promote
more formal power in the judiciary. With that project advanced, legal
mobilization then moves beyond courts. More disputes are legalized, but
this does not of course translate automatically into greater equality,
which has to be enforced through courts, but ultimately won through
other political means. This then leads into what Farid describes as
second-wave lawyering: a move toward more organized forms of legal
activism and the rise of NGOs that promote legal empowerment and
provide legal aid around social issues. In this model, advocacy occurs
inside and outside the court.
The Philippines case, detailed by Harry Roque, traces a
somewhat similar trajectory, though in a different context.'
CentreLaw's litigation campaign is focused on asserting greater
independence for courts to check the executive: it litigates to expand
standing, challenge martial law, and protect freedom of expression. Then
with the role of the court in the state on firmer ground, there is a shift to
other issues: reparations for mass rape and broader social justice causes,
including reproductive health.
The Alternative Law Forum (ALF) in India also adopts an
approach that goes beyond rights claiming, operating in the space of
strong democratic and legal institutions-with many problems of course,
but their existence is established. Thus, we see lawyers in ALF explicitly
embracing a multifaceted, beyond-the-court strategy of mobilizing law,
research, community organizing, and public policy advocacy around
critical social problems related to class inequality, religious freedom, and
sexuality. As the authors suggests, ALF is motivated by skepticism of
judicial-led social change movements, and instead seeks to use courts for
'" Cynthia Farid, New Paths to Justice: A Tale of Social Justice Lawyering in Bangladesh, 31 2013
WIS. INT'L L.J. 421 (2013).
16' Harry L. Roque, The Call of the Times: Strategic Public Interest Lawyering During the Arroyo
Regime in the Philippines, 2001-2010,31 2013 WIS. INT'L L.J. 462 (2013)
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its radiating effects. Within this space the move is from law or politics,
to law and politics.
When politics are relatively more open than law--Quadrant 2-
we expect to see robust legal and political mobilization in favor of a
greater role for the judiciary in the political sphere-what is already
achieved in Quadrant 1. Because political space may permit activism
with less risk of reprisal, and there may be some protections for speech
and opposition politics, we might expect to see centers for resistance
develop in the civil society space and then attempt to build law's
autonomy. We might also expect that because law is weak, legal
mobilization would be subsidiary to political action, or at least focus
more narrowly on building the rule of law. Again, it is extremely hard to
generalize because each country is different and political openness is
such a relative concept, since we may be talking of quite marginal
openings in politics relative to law. But there are some basic patterns
consistent with this model of building legal autonomy.
If we look to Mongolia, the story that Jigmeddash and
Rasmussen tell is one of nascent democratic institutions and a
burgeoning civil society, with law groups such as the Center for Human
Rights and Development formed to mobilize law in courts on behalf of
marginalized groups.' 8 But they do so in an environment in which law's
autonomy is constrained for several reasons: restrictive standing, no class
actions, civil law, and limited constitutional review. The profession is
also weak. So the turn to law is tentative, and designed to both advance
specific causes and to build the court's position within the state-thus
overcoming some of the challenges to public interest litigation. Cases
proceed through the administrative courts, where the issue is compliance
with basic regulations, and there are some early successes, notably the
2005 case challenging the imposition of city fees on new residents,
which severely hindered movement of the nomadic people. The authors
tell of an important challenge to mining rights, which is both locally
driven but also supported by external funding and technical support. This
work is not just about litigation, but is undertaken alongside a
coordinated protest and public relations campaign to put pressure on
government, which works, but then ultimately folds under the weight of
multinational corporate and government backlash.
168 Bayarra Jigmiddash & Jennifer Rasmussen, Protecting Community Rights: Prospects for Public
Interest Lawyering in Mongolia, 31 2013 WIS. INT'L L.J. 566 (2013).
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In Malaysia, we see a similarly tentative step into courts to build
power and advance the rule of law, but also deep investment in other
forms of politics.'69 There, law's role is constrained, primarily because of
the subservience of court to parliament. Kanesalingam tells of the launch
of the Centre for Constitutionalism and Human Rights not primarily as a
strategic litigation group, but one that turns to court as a last resort and in
connection with other strategies. It seeks to empower the citizenry
through information disseminated via its blog, research, and information
exchange. It seeks to build law's power incrementally-with the Muslim
child custody case he describes suggesting a small movement in favor of
civil over religious courts-but still emphasizes community education to
influence politics and promote the empowerment of marginalized
communities.
When, in Quadrant 3, law is relatively more open than politics,
then one would imagine that law would be deployed to try to check
government overreach and build space for greater dissent. Here is where
the case of Singapore may or may not fit easily within this category
alone. On the one hand, it seems right to suggest confined political space
with single-party politics, repression of opposition, and detention without
trial. But on the other, it may be a stretch to suggest judicial autonomy,
or even its potential, in light of the limitations on judicial support of civil
and political rights. As Rajah and Thiruvengadam suggest, there may be
contradictions within the concept of dual state legality that can be
exploited, but one aspect of legal autonomy that is not present is the
autonomy of lawyers, who have to be able to mobilize law for justice
without fear of reprisal-and that is certainly not the case, though there
may be some slight openings.' Without that, despite some judicial
independence, most lawyers are legitimately concerned about the
backlash against any activism, leading to-with dissident lawyer Ravi as
the exception-associational politics with NGOs rather than lawyers
entering court or engaging in public advocacy against the state.
This aspect of Singapore then begins to look more like Quadrant
4, where neither law is strong nor politics is open. In this environment, it
seems plausible to expect caution and incrementalism on the part of
lawyers (who are after all relative social elites dependent on the state for
their status), coupled with insider strategies where they are available to
resolve disputes. There are always exceptions, with lawyers at times
" Kanesalingham, supra note 80.
70 Rajah & Thiruvengadam, supra note 44.
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bringing more direct ideological challenges, though these carry grave
risks. And here the contributions draw distinctions between locally
rooted lawyers who adopt inside and incremental strategies focused on
basic administrative enforcement or negotiated settlement, and a smaller
number of lawyers more willing to walk up to or cross the line, some of
whom either start out as or become globally connected. Both insist on
formal legality, though take different paths to do so tied to the degree to
which they might minimize risk to personal and professional livelihood.
In Vietnam, John Gillespie focuses on lawyers' brokering role."'
There, the move is not to reform the state through law, but to make the
state work in accord with minimal state regulations, through brokering
and negotiating strategies to address disputes like the land confiscation
claim in his case study. In addition to these lawyer-brokers, there are, as
Gillespie shows, a small cadre of reform-oriented lawyers connected to
international networks, who look to law as a basis for checking state
power; these lawyers in the NGO sphere are connected to global funders
and networks, and take big risks, with many ultimately disbarred or
imprisoned.
In Myanmar, Nick Cheesman and Kyaw Min San's case study of
resistance to land confiscation focuses on the effort to enforce procedural
compliance with regulatory licensing.172 That campaign succeeds by
moving the case from the local to the national-and gaining some
international attention-in ways that impose enough costs on the
government and its private company partner to back down, though this
just means that they move operations to another location, not that
community members become endowed with rights they are able to assert
in the future. Also, it is important to underscore the cost: the lawyer who
handles the case loses his license. At the time of the study, although
Myanmar was not politically open and law was not autonomous from
state control, advocates were able to exploit the limited opportunities for
political and legal mobilization to win concessions, but at a great price to
the lawyer and with little impact on the political or legal systems.
In China, John Givens again focuses on the role of lawyers
channeling dissent through acceptable routinized processes, at times
gaining wider access through publicity."' We note again that many of the
administrative cases Givens studies center on land disputes, which
171 The Juridification of Cause Advocacy in Socialist Asia, supra note 65.
172 Cheesman & Kyaw Min San, supra note 44.
173 Givens, supra note 148.
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emerge as a common problem in socialist states where property rights are
subservient to party development priorities, although these are
intertwined with private interests. The "politically embedded" lawyers
Givens' profiles are walking a delicate line, using their local connections
and familiarity with administrative process to promote official legal
compliance through lawsuits ostensibly targeted to correct administrative
process defects. When they cross the line from contesting legal
procedure to challenging legal substance, they risk repression. Although
some administrative lawyers invite reprisal by asserting more explicit
challenges to state authority, most are acutely aware of how far they can
go in raising broader challenges and stay well within the bounds of
acceptable "corrective" litigation.
4. Comparative Themes
In addition to formulating predictions about how autonomy of
law and political openness may shape the scope and type of legal
mobilization in different countries, our comparative framework may help
to generate broader insights about legal mobilization in Asia. In this
section, we step back from a country-by-country approach to identify
several themes that emerge from comparative analysis.
First, judicial autonomy has an obvious relation to litigation.
Public interest litigation has been of more than marginal importance to
social justice practitioners only in the Quadrant 1 countries, and
primarily, though not exclusively, in India and the Philippines. For
countries outside of this group, courts have discouraged public interest
litigation in a variety of ways: ranging from refusal to take jurisdiction;
to "principled" rejection of claims in countries with conservative,
bureaucratic judiciaries; to ruling against the client in closed court; to
reprisals against the lawyer as well as the client. Public interest litigation
is not altogether absent outside of Quadrant 1 countries, but it is
undertaken for different purposes. In particular, we see lawyers in
countries without strong legal autonomy turning to courts precisely in
order to build basic rule of law principles to broaden the scope of judicial
review and legal access. For example, in Mongolia, public interest
litigation has been focused on access to the courts, ancillary to
addressing the merits of social justice issues. In more authoritarian states,
litigation may need to conform more closely to government interests. In
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China, what could be called public interest litigation is sometimes
approved when it coincides with the interests of powerful government
officials. Outside of these cases, litigation has often been a strategy to
gain wider public recognition for a cause without much hope of success
in court and which may place the lawyer at risk.174
Second, social justice practice often depends on the existence of
a vibrant professional community, which is possible only where the bar
has some degree of freedom to form independent organizations to
publicize and oppose the state's violation of rights or failure to follow the
rule of law. In this sense, the professional autonomy of the bar may be
supported by political openness. Though there are other reasons why a
legal profession may be stronger in some countries than others, greater
political openness may help explain the strength of lawyer organizations,
including bar associations, in the countries of Quadrant 2, which
otherwise measure low on legal autonomy. In countries in which the bar
has more independence, lawyers may press for more power, which, in
some cases, may be linked to the expansion of judicial independence.
Thus, in Bangladesh, efforts to suppress the national Bar Council
provoked protest and legal mobilization to bring a constitutional
challenge. The successful fight over judicial independence laid the
groundwork for further litigation, including a challenge to the long-
standing use of martial law by the government.
Professional communities have other important functions as
well, including recruiting new generations of reform-minded lawyers,
mentoring them, and, if possible, creating protected niches for
employment in firms, NGOs, or private practices. Countries such as
Thailand and Malaysia, but also elsewhere among countries in Quadrants
1 and 2, have created networks of support among lawyers who recruit,
mentor, and place young lawyers-many without credentialing abroad or
work experience-in elite firms. In contrast, more authoritarian countries
constrain professional independence. For example, Vietnam has kept
much tighter control over lawyers by forbidding "organizations with the
potential to mobilize resistance against the state" or "which function
independently from the party and the state.""'
Third, the ability to communicate with the larger public is a
central feature of successful legal mobilization for justice. Thus, where
communication is carefully controlled and public dissent suppressed by
" Gallagher, supra note 147.
.s The Juridaication of Cause Advocacy in Socialist Asia, supra note 65.
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the state, effective mobilization of law becomes difficult-often nearly
impossible. Quadrant 2 countries have relatively unresponsive
judiciaries, but openings for political discourse and action, which can
strengthen legal mobilization despite weak courts. For example, the
Malaysian state's reluctance to limit access to the Internet has had
enormously positive effects on civil society, leading to the development
of additional opportunities for mobilization of law. NGOs, including
lawyer-NGO alliances, have benefited in particular because they have the
resources to conduct media campaigns, but political openness provides a
critical resource-an audience-and in return, support for the
mobilization of law.
Fourth, political openness may also be related to the type of
practice sites that develop for activist lawyering in different countries,
such as NGOs, law school clinics, legal aid offices, social movement
organizations, and small private firms.' These practice sites relate to the
domestic political context in different ways. They are not evenly
distributed across the eleven countries in this issue because the state may
have a different view of each type of practice site. In addition, lawyers in
these sites have different access to resources and may face political
pressures that discourage them from adopting controversial forms of
practice. For instance, countries that are relatively closed (as in
Quadrant 4) may be more likely to tolerate, and even encourage, law
school clinics, and state-funded organizations because they are under
state control. Even though China and Vietnam have been resistant to
direct political challenges to the central state, their governments have
encouraged development of legal clinics within law schools. NGOs
require more political space, and they are especially important to activist
lawyers because they have the capacity to attract external funding and
are often linked to networks, communities, or media supporting issues
with which the NGOs are concerned."I NGOs are especially important in
countries with weak legal autonomy, where civil society presents
opportunities for social justice advocacy, but other professional paths,
such as employment by the government or self-sustaining private law
practices may be difficult for reform-oriented lawyers to enter and
maintain. Because they do not typically depend on the state-and thus
"6 See infra Part IIl.
" See, e.g., Steve Chamovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J.
INT'L L. 348 (2006) (arguing that NGOs have unique capacities and an important role in the
development of international law).
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are less subject to its control-NGOs and private law firms are more
likely to be targeted for regulation and control, ranging from legal
limitations to bureaucratic harassment and police sanctions. Countries in
Quadrants 3 and 4 have placed more restrictions on these potential sites
of practice and, consequently, there are far fewer NGO-supported roles
for lawyers to attempt to mobilize law for social justice.
Finally, and closely related, lawyers in Quadrant 4 countries,
where judicial autonomy and political openness are severely limited,
have depended to a much greater extent on relationships with the state,
including practicing at state-sponsored sites and establishing mutually
supportive relationships with officials. Opportunities for collaboration
with state officials are likely to grow with the increasing diversity of
political and social views among officials in local components of
complex government institutions."' As mentioned already, state
sponsored projects have included law school based clinics and public
legal aid. In China, some law faculty members who established legal
clinics have employed them to bring controversial litigation over rights;
indeed their location and elite status have undoubtedly provided a degree
of protection from reprisals."' Other state sponsored or approved projects
include some types of NGOs. Even the most repressive states have
tolerated some foreign-funded NGOs, which provide services the state
itself is unable to provide on its own."8 o Because the availability of
resources for social justice practice from international sources has been
an important element of so many of the stories of our collaborators we
turn next to a discussion of global support.
B. THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL SUPPORT
The contributions to this issue suggest another feature of legal
mobilization: that global support for social justice practice is influenced
by the domestic context within which such practice occurs. Further,
global support depends on the political goals of the donors. Observers
who have made similar points often focus on the latter-donor intent-
when expressing concerns that powerful Global North governments and
178 See PERELMAN & WHITE, supra note 8.
179 Liu, supra note 155.
180 See generally infra Part IV.B.
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NGOs attempt to advance their own interests through efforts to transplant
legal liberalism. While that concern is valid, it obscures the influence of
domestic politics on the availability of global support; who provides it,
and what it is ultimately used for-a point made quite powerfully in
Dezalay and Garth's demonstration that domestic elites build their own
capital by creating connections to global sponsors. Our observations in
this part extend Dezalay and Garth's insight to suggest how domestic
factors interact with global funding to produce uneven distribution of
resources and uneven, sometimes quite unpredictable, outcomes. Our
goal in this section is to illuminate some of these interactions-
suggesting that the scope and type of external support is mediated by the
relationship between the intentions of global donors and the domestic
space for mobilizing law that we have described in previous sections of
this article.
1. Global Intentions
We begin by examining the sources of support by international
donors and other advocates for the rule of law. Following World War II,
nations emerged from the conflict in Europe and Asia with a new world
order taking shape under the leadership of the United States and its allies,
including the establishment of the United Nations, international financial
institutions, and nation-to-nation support for development. A framework
for human rights created by a small group of countries has grown and
thrived since that time, becoming a truly global movement
notwithstanding the hegemony of the United States' economic and
political agenda in international relations.'
In the initial phases of the Cold War, the United States poured
enormous amounts of aid into particular developing countries,
supplemented by grants from large foundations led by members of the
' Hope Lewis, "New" Human Rights: US. Ambivalence Toward International Economic and
Social Rights Framework, in BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME, A HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 100, 103 (Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2009). The United States' top
priority has not been human rights but promotion of economic and political development
according to its own vision-a vision that has evolved with the shifting patterns of elite politics
in the U.S.
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same policy elite.182 Both forms of aid were intended to stimulate a
version of state-led development distinct from communism.' As the
Cold War wound down, American policy shifted to emphasize the
expansion of free markets, deregulation, and institutions of democratic
governance needed to support these goals. In the 1970s and 1980s, policy
elites trained in neoliberal economics promoted free markets, private
development, and deregulation while tolerating authoritarian
governments, which suppressed political and social resistance that might
impede these policies.'84
The approach promoted by neoliberal policy advisors ignored the
unequal distributive effects of free markets and deregulation, and put the
development policies of the United States, and its representatives at the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, squarely at odds with
emerging criticism in the Third World and with a rising global
consciousness of human rights."' Major U.S. foundations, which had
acted in concert with the U.S. government through the earlier law and
development phase, changed direction abruptly when the older policy
elites, already disenchanted with "law and development" and losing
influence at the highest levels of foreign policy, became critics of U.S.
support for dictators in Latin America implementing neoliberal economic
policies while disregarding human rights."' However, until the end of the
1970s, Cold War priorities continued to unite American elites on some
objectives. While foundation support for human rights advocacy flowed
182 Rockefeller's long-standing relationship with medical schools in China was abruptly ended
when the communist movement won power in 1947. See Fengshi Wu, Double-Mobilization:
Transnational Advocacy Networks for China's Environment and Public Health (Aug. 5, 2005)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland) (on file with Digital Repository of
University of Maryland), available at http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/2970/l/umi-umd-
2764.pdf. See also STERN, supra note 141, at 179-211. The major cold war recipients of aid in
Asia were countries in Quadrant I. For example, enormous USAID and foundation investments
in Thailand were linked to its role as a demonstration project for capitalist development and a
buffer against communism's spread from China and Vietnam. ROBERT J. MUSCAT, THAILAND
AND THE UNITED STATES: DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY, AND FOREIGN AID (1990).
1 Gary Hess, Waging the Cold War in the Third World: The Foundations and the Challenges of
Development, in CHARITY, PHILANTHROPY AND CIVILITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 319
(Lawrence J. Friedman & Mark D. McGarvie eds., 2003).
* See Cummings & Trubek, supra note 3, at 10-12.
85 Cummings and Trubek note the irony of the role of these policies in launching an international
human rights movement both in the US and in Europe. Id. at 12.
..6 See also Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Constructing Law Out ofPower: Investing in Human
Rights as an Alternative Political Strategy, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL
ERA, supra note 2, at 354 (describing the role of the Ford Foundation as the a major source of
support for human rights advocacy under authoritarian rulers in Latin America and elsewhere)
[hereinafter Constructing Law out ofPower].
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to Latin America, no similar support was offered for human rights in
Asia, a region where the U.S. military was engaged and the threat from
communism seemed real and imminent.'"
When the Cold War ended, the United States and international
development agencies were compelled to change course to address
market failures, massive social dislocations, rising inequality, and
unrelieved deep poverty.' Their new approach embraced "good
governance," requiring greater emphasis on institutional development,'
especially democratic institutions of accountability and the rule of law,
which blended protection for private property with guarantees for civil,
political, and basic human rights viewed as necessary for citizen
empowerment and participation.
The rule of law has remained the cornerstone of United States
and international development policy for the past two decades, drawing
with it the major international agencies, private foundations, NGOs, and
advocacy groups seeking to reinforce the message of the new
Washington Consensus or modify it to serve purposes of their own.
While rule of law advocates embrace different, sometimes conflicting,
goals for political and economic development," among those who have
benefited directly-both discursively and financially-are advocates
contesting international environmental, labor, and human rights abuses.'9'
These groups have sought to advance the rule of law movement by
leveraging the legal and moral power of domestic, regional, and
international agreements and institutions, and mobilizing the
187 Hess, supra note 183.
188 See Cummings & Trubek, supra note 3.
89 Id. at 17-18. The World Bank's embrace of the rule of law is explored by Mythmaking in the
Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, supra note 49.
19 On the variety of objectives embraced by international and domestic "rule of law" advocates see
Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 31 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
19' See Cummings & Trubek, supra note 3, at 19. The change in policy in the 1990s brought to the
fore funders interested in building the rule of law movement, such as Ford, OSI, USAID, the
International Monetary Fund and major agencies and philanthropies from Canada, Europe and
Australia as well. This ideologically diverse core group has been in agreement about support for
"free market economies, an empowered judiciary to protect private property and individual
liberty, and access to justice for all social classes to insure political legitimacy." Scott
Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57 DuKE L.J. 891, 964 (2007).
While this convergence has supported judicial independence and enforcement of law it does not
mean complete agreement on other goals which, for some, encompass a broader meaning of
human rights and willingness to become involved more deeply in the politics of accountability
and reform.
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extraterritorial jurisdiction of tribunals in the United States and
elsewhere.192
The rule of law movement has also had a less direct, but no less
important influence on social justice advocates. The rule of law resonates
with resistance to authoritarian rule, inequality, abuse of power, and with
aspirations for a fairer distribution of resources and opportunities in
developing societies. While the rule of law is not a new concept in the
developing world, the rule of law movement has linked law to the
aspiration for political democracy and resistance to economic inequality.
Thus, the rule of law movement has not only driven development of
international governance, but it has also encouraged domestic advocates
for social justice to focus on law. Commenting on this trend, Cummings
and Trubek concluded that an important effect of the movement has been
to encourage "lawyers to invest in constructing and monitoring state
institutions from the inside" and to "retool as public interest lawyers."' 93
The point we suggest here is that neither of these effects of the
rule of law movement-the direct effect of support linked to
international development goals and the indirect effect of encouraging
domestic rule of law advocacy-has been evenly distributed or had equal
influence in all countries. Scholars have examined the origins of donor
policies and their shifts over time in relation to Global North
governments,'94 international organizations,'95 major foundations,"' and a
variety of NGOs both domestic' and international.' Far less attention
192 Cummings & Trubek, supra note 3, at 19-27. The authors note that while social justice
advocates may benefit at times from the broader movement for rule of law, they are also often in
sharp conflict other advocates for the rule of law, especially governments and international
investors seeking stronger legal institutions that support property rights, economic investment,
and law enforcement to insure a relatively tranquil civil society.
'9' Id. at 19.
' See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS:
LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICA (2002)
[hereinafter THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS].
19 See, e.g., Antje Vetterlein, Economic Growth, Poverty Reduction and the Role of Social
Policies: The Evolution of the World Bank's Social Development Approach, 13 Global
Governance 513 (2007). See also Cummings & Trubek, supra note 3, at 20-21.
196 See, e.g., KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 64 (discussing the funding of the Ford Foundation);
STERN, supra note 141 (discussing the evolution of "soft support" policies of major foundations,
NGOs, public and private institutions for development in China).
197 Analysis of the role played by the hundreds, even thousands, of NGOs with transborder interests
has been less systematic, embedded in case studies of particular movements and transborder
activities. For general consideration of these sources of influence see THE NEW TRANSNATIONAL
ACTIVISM, supra note 4.
198 We have in mind international nongovernmental organizations [INGOs] such as Amnesty
International, International Organization of Migrants, the International Bar Association Human
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has been paid to the ways in which the domestic space for legal
mobilization at the receiving end of rule of law initiatives has influenced
access to and uses of global resources. It is to that issue that we now turn.
2. Domestic Reception
In this section, we suggest how differences in the domestic space
for legal mobilization in receiving countries may influence the
distribution of global support for social justice causes. Specifically, we
explore how global funding relates to the timing of domestic political
openings, the identity of domestic recipients, and the nature of domestic
sites of practice. Examining each of these dimensions of support-
timing, recipients, and sites-reveals an important dynamic, namely that
global support is related in critical ways to both autonomy of law and
political openness within each country.
Our analysis finds that where political openness is limited, global
investment in the rule of law tends to focus on expanding the autonomy
of legal institutions in ways that will achieve the donor's specific
political or economic goals. Governments and major foundations are
often major players in this phase of global support, seeking areas of
mutual agreement with domestic political leaders for the development of
the rule of law, such as supporting international trade, economic
development, and private investment, but rarely political liberalization.
Advocates whose goals are incompatible with those of domestic political
leaders must resort to forums for advocacy outside the country. In
contrast, where politics are relatively open, global rule of law support
shifts toward legal advocacy for specific social or political causes,
whether or not political leaders fully approve. At this stage, global
support for domestic advocacy may be channeled through a far more
diverse community of advocacy organizations and on behalf of more
politically contentious goals. Our overview of global funding reinforces
an important theme in the globalization literature: that the rule of law
movement is not a unidirectional process of legal transplant, but a
dynamic exchange-and often a contest-between rule of law sponsors
Rights Institute, and the International Council of Jurists, or the International Union for
Conservation of Nature. For a discussion of the role of U.S. based human rights INGOs see
Constructing Law out ofPower, supra note 186.
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and political actors, including social change advocates, in the Global
South.199
i. Timing
Opportunities for global intervention-whether by governments
in the Global North, international agencies, private foundations, NGOs,
or movement organizations-are necessarily influenced by domestic
political conditions. Since the beginning of the law and development
movement at the end of World War 11,200 global support for legal
modernization generally, and social justice advocacy in particular, has
responded to domestic political conditions, which have affected the type
of aid countries have received--or indeed whether they have received
any aid at all. Most obviously, domestic political closure or the rise of
power holders antagonistic to donor interests can sever ties. In 1947, the
Rockefeller Foundation ended a long-standing relationship with Peking
University Medical School when the Chinese Communist Party ascended
to power and the United States severed diplomatic ties.2"' USAID and
other U.S. government agencies withdrew direct support from China for
nearly fifty years.202 Similarly, the U.S. government terminated most aid
to Myanmar in 1962 after the takeover by a dictatorship professing
socialist ideology and to Vietnam in 1976 after the withdrawal of U.S.
troops from Vietnam.203
In contrast, the flow of aid has often increased in response to
greater openness. Reflecting-and attempting to promote---changed
conditions, Congress has recently restored authorization for some forms
199 In Part IV we return to the narratives of practitioners to make this point, for their stories are
often about indigenous movements for change that opportunistically find global, and often
transient, sponsors that may or may not have had an important influence on their goals, strategies
or the viability of their work.
20 TRUBEK & SANTOS, supra note 15.
201 See Wu, supra note 182.
202 See Development Experience Clearinghouse, China, Projects 1946-1996, U.S. AGENCY FOR
INT'L DEv. [hereinafter USAID],
https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/search/SearchResults.aspx?q=Q2hpbmE%3d (last visited Aug. 12,
2013) (listing only 16 USAID projects for the fifty-year period).
203 See Burma: History, USAID (Aug. 2005), http://www.usaid.gov/burma/history; Vietnam,
USAID (Aug. 2013), http://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work/asia/vietnam.
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of direct U.S. government aid to China, Vietnam, and Myanmar.2" Even
when direct aid has not been politically possible, funds from Global
North donors have sometimes flowed to NGOs within recipient countries
when their governments have indicated a willingness to accept them.
Major foundations, especially those in the United States, have sometimes
taken the lead or played the role of intermediary when direct
governmental aid was not politically feasible. The Ford Foundation
resumed contacts with China in 1979 and, with the Chinese
government's support, quickly established connections between major
U.S. law schools and elite Chinese universities-with important
implications for social justice advocacy.205 Some Chinese law faculty
members who were participants in this collaboration subsequently
founded legal clinics at elite Chinese law schools.206 Similarly, Ford
began supporting human rights awareness soon after the fall of Ferdinand
Marcos in the Philippines and by 1985 had funded a network of Alt-Law
NGOs to litigate human rights.207 Likewise, when Bangladesh's lawyers
and judiciary asserted independence in 1989 to limit authoritarian control
of government institutions, Ford and other foundations soon offered
funding to fledgling legal clinics and advocates for the poor, women, and
the environment. Following Mongolia's abrupt democratic turn in 1991,
the Asia Foundation and other private intermediaries (with USAID
funding) began supporting rights-oriented NGOs "to serve as a potential
firewall against governmental encroachments on civil liberties and
political freedom" as the new democracy took shape.208
Infrastructure assistance, intended to modernize and rebuild state
institutions, has often been one of the first types of aid to be offered after
204 U.S. support for China revived in 1997 with an agreement under Clinton's administration,
although funding does not seem to have started until 2000 with funding for promoting
democracy and normalizing trade relations, and for cultural NGOs. See U.S.-China Trade
Relations Act of 2000, 114 Stat. 880; Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, 113 Stat. 1502.
205 Liu, supra note 155. Aubrey McCutcheon, Contributing to Legal Reform in China, in MANY
ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE LAW-RELATED WORK OF FORD FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND THE
WORLD, supra note 95, at 159.
206 Liu, supra note 155.
207 Stephen Golub, Participatory Justice in the Philippines, in MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE
LAW-RELATED WORK OF FORD FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 95, at
197.
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political or economic transitions, which appear to create opportunities to
establish institutions embodying values and practices supported by
Global North donors.2" Such aid typically flows directly to govermnent
agencies whose own priorities shape how that aid is used.2"o To donors,
infrastructure assistance implicitly supports political as well as economic
purposes, including promoting liberal values among educated
government officials and professionals, encouraging free market
development, and protecting foreign economic investments.21'
Infrastructure aid was a central part of U.S. support to Thailand in the
1960s to create a foundation for a modem market society. This included
funding rural health facilities and schools, but also foundation-sponsored
training for university faculty and government bureaucrats.2 12
Infrastructure programs were not only among the first forms of global
support for China's economic liberalization in 1979, but also for post-
Suharto Indonesian liberalization after 1999.213 Infrastructure aid to help
modernize Vietnam's system of public administration has been the core
of donor funding since the early 1990s,2 14 contributing to its economic
growth in the twenty-first century.2 15 This type of assistance often
includes support for legal reforms such as judicial training, court
management training, establishment of basic legal services programs,
and revision of statutory law.2 16 Following the Asian fiscal crisis in 1997-
1998, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund promoted
209 Foreign Assistance: Rule ofLaw Funding for Fiscal Years 1993-1998, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE (1999), http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/227749.pdf; THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS AND
THE ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE (Gregory W. Noble & John Ravenhill eds., 2000).
210 Sidel observes that donor support for country wide legal services in Vietnam was captured by a
few large organizations close to the Vietnamese government and never reached small,
underserved communities. SIDEL, supra note 87, at 169.
211 Scholars have cast serious doubt on the effectiveness of these programs for transmitting values
or long term commitment to liberal market reforms. Infrastructure and "soft support" were
considered a failure in both Latin America and Asia. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 34;
Hess, supra note 183; THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS, supra note 194.
Additional reasons for skepticism about infrastructure aid are explored in Molly Land, Human
Rights Frames in IP Contests, in BALANCING WEALTH AND HEALTH: GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND THE BATTLE OVER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN LATIN
AMERICA (Rochelle Dreyfuss & Cdsar Rodriguez-Garavito eds., forthcoming Mar. 2014).
212 In addition to "soft support" for China described in note 173, see SIDEL, supra note 87, at 195.
213 See Indonesia Control of Corruption Project: Final Report, USAID (Nov. 2009),
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/PDACN906.pdf, Indonesia, Local Governance Support Program:
Final Report, USAID (Dec. 2009), http://pdfusaid.gov/pdf docs/PDACP359.pdf.
214 See generally Vietnam: History, USAID (Aug. 2013), http://www.usaid.gov/vietnam/history.
215 Id; see also SIDEL, supra note 87, at 141-166.
216 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 209; see also SIDEL, supra 87; Liu, supra note
155; Constructing Law out ofPower, supra note 186.
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law reform, including the establishment of bankruptcy courts and other
protections for investors.217
ii. Recipients
Donor self-interest is the most important factor channeling
support to aid recipients. Donors want to achieve specific goals and
choose recipients that will serve their purposes. Donors also want
continuing "engagement" or "development," and thus pick recipients
they believe will succeed or survive even if it means compromising
goals. Donor goals vary, and while many provide direct or indirect
support for social justice lawyers by funding law school clinics, rights-
oriented NGOs, legal aid outreach, empowerment projects to teach
citizens about rights, and litigation projects, such support is not
uniformly distributed. This section explores some of the factors that
shape funding distribution, focusing particularly on global and local
dynamics that influence the status of recipients within the field of
domestic politics.
Political shifts within the United States make a difference, as we
have already seen. During the "law and development" phase of U.S.
foreign policy, funding by major foundations focused on training an elite
group of leaders to promote acceptance of modem administration and
American democratic values. During the contemporary rule of law phase,
the same foundations have continued "structural support" to train
government officials in key positions, but have also extended training
and material support for "capacity building" and "empowerment" of
marginalized social classes and outsider groups, consistent with efforts to
build a pluralistic democratic society. These changes have affected the
type of recipients to whom aid is targeted.
Greater political openness may change the targets of global
funders by increasing opportunities to strengthen domestic political
constituencies. This had been evident in some countries where greater
political openness has reduced the need for donors to resort to external
pressure for human rights enforcement and increased the same donors'
interest in building connections and political capacity within a country to
advance domestic causes. As a result, some funders have shifted away
217 THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE, supra note 209.
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from international human rights projects toward greater support to
projects emphasizing specific local concerns or cross-cutting
transnational issues. Ford's shift from funding human rights litigation
projects in the 1970s (Chile) and 1980s (Philippines) to projects for
litigating social causes in the 1990s (Bangladesh) tracks this larger
trend.21 8 In Indonesia, for example, over the past fifteen years funders
have shifted their priorities from human rights to environmental causes,
women's rights, or the problems of ethnic minorities and other
marginalized groups.219 With respect to transnational issues, beginning in
the 1990s, Global North governments and United Nations agencies began
targeting funding to support environmental enforcement in Asia and
elsewhere by promoting statutory reforms,220 offering training for
enforcement officials, and subsidizing establishment of special courts or
panels of judges trained in environmental law. Similarly, concerns about
criminal trafficking in weapons, illegal goods, and human labor resulted
in UN adoption of aggressive programs pressuring societies in Asia and
elsewhere to enact laws and pursue enforcement in accordance with
Global North standards.22' Some NGOs, like TRAFCORD in Thailand,
while rooted in a long-standing domestic movement, have sought to tap
into such transnational funding streams.222
When domestic political space closes, some donors' targets
change because it becomes more difficult to channel funds to dissident
causes without jeopardizing ongoing donor access-and sometimes the
safety of domestic recipients. Closure is often maintained by private
organization registration and reporting requirements as well as formal
and informal political reprisal directed against recipients223 and their
funders.224 Sensitivity to the political jeopardy of recipients prompts
218 Id.
219 Ford, supra note 110. A similar trend has been observed in Malaysia. See Tey, supra note 117.
220 The famous United Nations "Earth Summit" held in Rio De Janeiro in 1992, attended by more
than 170 countries, resulted in an increase in global awareness and action on the environment,
encouraging many countries to enact environmental protection laws patterned after those in
developed countries. See Earth Summit: UN Conference on Environment and Development
(1992), UNITED NATIONS (May 1997), http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html.
221 Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and Anti-
Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655 (2010).
222 Wongsa, supra note 65. On the difference between Global North and Global South policies, see
generally, Ratna Kapur, Cross-border Movements and the Law: Renegotiating the Boundaries of
Difference, in TRAFFICKING AND PROSTITUTION RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
MIGRATION, SEX WORK, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (Kamala Kempadoo et al. eds., 2012).
223 See Wong, supra note 158; see also Human Rights Monitoring Report, supra note 96.
224 See LUM, supra note 151 and personal communication with the author.
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some donor self-regulation.225 In these contexts, donors may become
more inclined to work within the narrow parameters set by authoritarian
regimes to maintain a toehold of support. As a result, groups closest to
the state are often in a position to benefit most from foreign support,
while those mobilizing law for the least powerful may do so with the
fewest resources.226
China is one example of this dynamic. After going to great
lengths to bar contacts with the West, China began to gradually open
after the collapse of its economy in the late 1970s. Since then, China has
carefully selected some aid recipients, acting as intermediary for
connections between government officials (which include law school
faculty) and Western contacts. 227 Legal aid funded by Ford was initially
co-sponsored by the Chinese government. As China has promoted more
legal modernization, it has also tolerated some donor support for some
nongovernmental clinics mobilizing law for rights.228 Other relatively
closed societies have limited donor access in part by acting as
intermediary or by requiring a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
specifying a funder's goals and proposed recipients.229 Even more open
countries have sometimes required donors to enter into MOUs, and some
countries have imposed restrictions to express displeasure with the
behavior of the funded organizations.230
225 For example, the State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor recently
removed the list of recipients of direct aid from its China webpages, presumably to protect them
from local reprisals. Email communication from Thomas Lum, Congressional Research Service
(Mar. 12, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Thomas Lum E-mail].
226 Other scholars reach similar conclusions for particular countries. See Liu, supra note 155; see
also SIDEL, supra note 87, at 168-69.
2 Liu, supra note 155.
228 McCutcheon, supra note 95, at 196; similarly, Singaporean statutory law permits foreign
donations only to "non-political" organizations. See Koh & Ling, supra note 87.
2 For example, the Thailand International Development Cooperation Agency [TICA] and its
predecessor agencies have long required international donors to enter into such agreements.
Interview with Apinan Patharathiyanon, Director, TICA (July 11, 2011). Other authoritarian
countries are also believed to limit access by international partners who are expected to limit
their contact and support for civil society organization. Personal communication from Thomas
Lum E-mail, supra note 225.
230 In 2011, the PM of Bangladesh temporarily froze funding for NGOs to express displeasure with
their political opposition to his own political party. See Mohosinul Karim, PM asks DCs to
regulate activities ofNGOs, DHAKA TRIBUNE (July 24, 2013),
http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2013/jul/24/hasina-asks-des-hunt-down-ngos-
involved-militant-financing. In 2012, the government of Bangladesh banned Medecins Sans
Frontieres for allegedly helping Rohingya refugees fleeing Myanmar. See Bangladesh:
Immediately Lift Ban on Medecins Sans Frontieres, Action Against Hunger and Muslim Aid UK,
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Nationalism has also sometimes restricted the inflow of global
funds. For example, in non-socialist societies like Malaysia and
Singapore, nationalism has spurred governmental and popular resistance
to human rights,23' resulting in some restriction on global funding. More
diffuse nationalism and anti-colonialism have motivated popular
resistance to some Western funders.232
iii. Practice Sites
As our discussion so far has already made clear, a key point of
contact between global donor interests and domestic politics is at the
level of the practice site. Different sites of practice have very different
positions in the field of domestic politics of receiving countries. The
position of a site is related to its perceived political independence, and in
turn to the deployment of particular legal strategies. In general, we would
expect that more open societies with stronger legal cultures will have a
more diverse range of practice forms (with greater external support) that
use more regime-challenging strategies; more closed societies will
attempt to minimize regime challenges by attempting to keep legal
practice more closely under state control-and thus limit external
funding of NGOs.
Rule of law programs have been widely credited with
encouraging development of important new sites of social justice
practice, such as law school clinics, NGOs, legal aid programs, pro bono
NETH. AID (Aug. 2012), http://www.nl-aid.org/domain/ngolbangladesh-immediately-lift-ban-on-
medecins-sans-frontieres-msf-action-against-hunger-acf-and-muslim-aid-uk/.
231 Mahatir Mohamad, Malaysia's authoritarian prime minister, who held office from 1981 to 2003,
defended his authoritarian rule and restricted observance of human rights based on his
interpretation of "Asian values," a view which still resonates throughout the region influencing
the separate course the Asian regional body, ASEAN, has chosen and especially the ASEAN
Human Rights Declaration. Thio Li-ann, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries:
Promises to Keep and Miles to Go before I Sleep, 2 YALE HUM. RTs. & Dev. L.J. 1 (1999). On
Singapore, see Garry Rodan, supra, note 135. USAID made relatively few grants to Malaysia
during this period, none supporting rule of law, human rights, or governance projects. The Ford
Foundation funded two projects while Mahathir was in office, one notably related to the rule of
law, a 1988-1992 project on "The Implementation of the Syariah Criminal Law and its Impact on
Women," Ford Foundation grant #0085082. E-mail from Lucas Buresch, Assistant Archivist,
Rockefeller Archive Ctr., (Feb. 7, 2013) (on file with Frank Munger, author). This exception to
the pattern may reflect Mahathir's concerns about the growing political influence of the Islamic
courts and community rivaling his one-party rule. Lai Suat Yan, Participation of the Women's
Movement in Malaysia: The 1999 General Election, in CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 122,
137 (Lee Hock Guan ed., 2004).
232 For example, it is widely known that many potential Asian donee groups have refused Open
Society Institute funding because of George Soros' role in the Asian financial crisis.
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practice by mainstream law firms, private law firms committed to public
interest practice, and bar associations."' Many of the contributors to this
issue have been situated at one time or another in sites that received
foreign support, often leading to other opportunities to advance their
careers as social justice lawyers. Yet the distribution of these
opportunities varies by country. For example, while clinics providing
legal services for a variety of ordinary legal matters are externally funded
in almost all of the countries represented in this issue, funding for NGOs
engaged in public interest litigation is limited to those countries that are
the most politically open and have the strongest culture of legal
autonomy.234 Funding for legally activist NGOs has been highly
restricted in the most closed societies,235 or carefully tailored to promote
regime preferences.236
In less politically open societies where law has relatively little
autonomy from domination by political leaders, practice sites associated
with social justice lawyering, if any, are most closely connected to the
state. Clinics (both in law schools and state-funded NGOs) are a point of
convergence between donors interested in promoting the rule of law and
authoritarian governments that recognize the need for increased legal
services for ordinary citizens confronting a complex modern state-but
one resistant to rights mobilization. Thus, legal clinics providing basic
advice to individuals about bureaucratic procedures or technical legal
compliance with basic rights (like minimum employment standards) may
receive some internal and external financial support (monitored by the
state), while NGOs advancing rights that challenge government authority
will not.237 NGOs independent of the state are less likely to be tolerated
233 McCutcheon, supra note 95.
234 For example, the Ford Foundation litigation projects have been welcomed in Quadrant I
countries such as the Philippines, India, and Bangladesh, while its aid to countries in other
Quadrants has been more limited in scope and typically in collaboration with the government.
See MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE LAW-RELATED WORK OF FORD FOUNDATION GRANTEES
AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 95; Liu, supra note 155, at 278, 283.
235 Liu, supra note 155.
236 See supra notes 227-230 and accompanying text.
237 See, for example, The Juridification of Cause Advocacy in Socialist Asia, supra note 65, who
describes the contrasting the Vietnamese government's response to the work of two social justice
lawyers in Vietnam. In China, Guo Jianmei is the internationally acclaimed founder of Peiking
University's Centre for Women's Law and Legal Services who receives support and recognition
from the Chinese government. However, many Chinese lawyers for social causes have faced
serious reprisals for advocacy about sensitive political issues, especially since a shift in central
Chinese policy in 2003 which has limited the political space for rights advocacy. Hualing Fu &
Richard Cullen, The development of public interest litigation in China, in PUBLIC INTEREST
LITIGATION IN ASIA, supra note 1, at 9, 28. More generally, the U.S. based Committee to
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unless they are providing welfare services that supplement the state's
capacity, for example, by providing critical health services and poverty
relief.238 Despite general restrictions on rights mobilization in less
politically open societies, it may nonetheless be permitted when it serves
state interests.239 For instance, individual litigation may be allowed by the
central government as a vehicle to control corrupt local officials without
expending political or financial resources required for direct
intervention.240
Some examples from countries represented in this issue illustrate
these dynamics. In Vietnam, limited clinical programs have developed
alongside a small number of state and internationally supported NGOs.
Since the mid-1990s, global donors have partnered with the Vietnamese
government and Communist Party to develop the capacity of legal
institutions to implement new laws appropriate for a modern market
society, but the government has successfully resisted attempts to expand
access to justice for poor and politically excluded interests outside of
government-controlled entities.24 ' Vietnam began to incorporate clinical
legal education into its national plans in the early 2000s,242 yet most of
the increasing international aid for legal development has gone to
agencies and NGOs closest to the state to support state-approved
economic and structural law reform projects.243 Law reforms to meet
rising legal needs of workers, poor individuals, minorities, or other
groups increasingly disadvantaged by development have received far less
international support. However, some law reform efforts for these groups
have been advanced by a few activist lawyers, a growing state legal aid
system, and smaller, more progressive NGOs without the help of global
donors 2"-illustrating that sometimes initial domestic support for legal
clinics might create pressure for expanded rights advocacy. In contrast to
Support Chinese Lawyers has regularly reported human rights violations experienced by lawyers
during recent government crackdowns on rights advocacy. See About Us, COMM. TO SUPPORT
CHINESE LAWYERS, http://www.csclawyers.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2013).
23 Between 1962 and 2010, under the junta, Myanmar received little funding from Global North
government sources or foundations. Exceptions were humanitarian aid, typically, but not
exclusively provided through charities with a religious affiliation and a long-standing reputation
for non-alignment.
239 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
240 Liebman, supra note 146.
241 SIDEL, supra note 87.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 168-69.
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both Vietnam and China, which have promoted carefully controlled
development of rule of law capacity, Myanmar's political and economic
closure left little space for collaboration with donors or the state, and
social justice practice was carried on by a few private practitioners at
great personal risk.24 S
There are other ways that authoritarian states may be losing
control over even those sites for mobilization of law closest to state
power. With the spreading influence of the Internet and mobile phone
technology, legal proceedings that violate the rule of law are increasingly
likely to receive publicity beyond the control of the state. For example,
the prestige of such organizations such as the International Commission
of Jurists and the International Bar Association Human Rights Institute
makes it difficult for even the most authoritarian states to deny them
observer status at politically sensitive trials. These organizations have
gained access to trials in all but the most authoritarian countries.246 But
even in China, as John Givens reports in this issue, decisions in some
court cases are more likely to be reported in the press and known to the
public than equivalent decisions made by bureaucrats, and thus there are
reasons for lawyers to bring cases in court that they have no hope of
winning.24
245 Nick Cheesman, How an Authoritarian Regime in Burma Used Special Courts to Defeat
Judicial Independence, 45 LAW & SOC'Y. REv. 801 (2011).
246 See generally An Introduction to Trial Monitoring, IFEX,
http://www.ifex.org/campaigns/tools-resources-trial_monitoring/ (last visited on June 9, 2013)
(with examples from Quadrant I countries) [hereinafter IFEX]; Quadrant IV. China: see Special
report: China's new leaders advance Internet control, IFEX (July, 25 2013),
http://www.ifex.org/china/; Vietnam: see, e.g., IBAHRI trial observers denied access to trial of
Vietnamese activists for subversion, INT'L BAR ASS'N (Jan. 2010),
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=5b7bc8eb-aadd-4ea4-bcc4-f837a973fafc;
see generally Appeal for immediate release of Vietnamese blogger Dieu Cay on hunger strike,
IFEX (July 24, 2013), http://www.ifex.org/vietnam/. Quadrant II: International trial observers
have been present at trials in Malaysia since 2000. Tey, supra note 117. Quadrant III: Singapore:
see, e.g., Singapore: International Trial Observer to Attend Court ofAppeal as Former
Opposition Leader JB Jeyaretnam Faces Possible Expulsion from Parliament, AMNESTY INT'L
(July 20, 2001), http://www.amnesty.org.uk/newsdetails.asp?NewslD-13875 (last visited June
9,2013).
247 Gallagher, supra note 10. For example, Chen Guangchen, the Chinese dissident, who escaped
house arrest in 2012 and sought refuge in the U.S. embassy, made this choice when he sued the
Chinese government over its "one-child" policy, triggering a repressive response. Chen's story is
rare. Courts have also served a number of useful functions in strategies for mobilizing law for
social justice in China and elsewhere short of provoking personal reprisal. See Michael Dowdle,
On The Regulatory Dynamic of Judicialization: The Promise and Perils of Exploring
'Judicialization' in East and Southeast Asia, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN
ASIA: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 23.
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As this suggests, the mix of practice sites in China, their relation
to different legal strategies for social justice, and their connection to
global funding is complex. In China, as we have already seen, the
development of law school clinics was among the first results of the Ford
Foundation's path-breaking assistance in the 1980s.2 48 Ford's support
also assisted in the establishment of government legal aid clinics and, as
China moved toward greater acceptance of the rule of law in the 1990s,
the first nongovernmental legal aid center.249 Thus, China has chosen to
support state-financed legal aid clinics-but has been far more cautious
about permitting funding for legal mobilization outside of government
institutions. Rachel Stern documents the role of the Chinese state in
directing-and limiting-the support of international donors for NGO
activities. While China permits some global funding for environmental
advocacy, it is typically channeled to support seminars and policy
development but not litigation, which, many American funders in Beijing
agree, "falls beyond their comfort zone."250 State harassment and the risk
of being shut down, or worse, is an ever-present reality for the few legal
organizations that exist.25' The result is that NGOs that address the legal
needs of those without access to political power and most in need of law
reform are least likely to receive international support.
Elsewhere, we see that even when international funding exists
for public interest litigation, weak domestic legal institutions can blunt
its impact. The limited successes of public interest litigation in Mongolia
suggests the force of the elite consensus behind preventing the courts
from interfering with projects that are profitable to businesses supporting
its economy in spite of financial support flowing from Mongolia's chief
international patron, the United States.252 In other places, global funders
simply do not reach lawyers who lack access to global networks. Many
social justice lawyers, like those who pursue mundane but important
cases in administrative courts, or those in small firms, have less
opportunity for contact with the global community or to receive global
assistance. This stratification becomes more pronounced as countries
become more closed, but is observable everywhere as a function of
248 Liu, supra note 155; McCutcheon, supra note 95, at 182-4.
249 McCutcheon, supra note 95, at 183-84,
250 STERN, supra note 141, at 189.
251 Id. at 188-89.
2s2 Bayartsetseg Jigmeddash & Jennifer Rasmussen, Protecting Community Rights: Prospects for
Public Interest Lawyering in Mongolia, 31 WIS. INT'L L.J. 566 (2013); See also LAWRENCE,
supra note 119.
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global sponsors' focused interests and limited knowledge of the diversity
of legal mobilization across Asia.
V. CONCLUSION: LEARNING ABOUT-AND FROM-LEGAL
MOBILIZATION IN ASIA
The articles in this issue provide an innovative comparative look
at Asian lawyers who mobilize law for justice. The insights it offers
build upon unique contributions by practicing lawyers on the front lines
of social change across Asia as well as academic area specialists. This
article has offered a wider perspective on their contributions, framing the
work of empirical researchers and practitioners who have provided
detailed descriptions and careful analyses of efforts to mobilize law for
justice in particular countries. The great variety of careers, strategies and
outcomes described in the articles written by these contributors led us to
propose a new perspective on legal development. As we argue, the
mobilization of law for justice has been ubiquitous in the region, driven
in part by international opportunity and influence but also by popular
expectations and politics from within. While other scholars have placed
great emphasis on global influence and exchange in legal development,
we have been influenced by the perspective that arises from the
narratives and analyses of lawyers struggling for justice for particular
causes within each country. Their experiences draw attention to the
importance of the political context for their work that both generates
conflict and influences the resources that may be mobilized for social
change. We sought to create a framework for comparing of the
interaction of local political context and global resources, and to examine
its implications for mobilization of law for social justice across the
eleven Asian countries examined in this issue.
From the point of view of lawyers for the politically weak, law is
an important resource because of its capacity to draw support from those
committed to the law-though perhaps not to the underlying social
justice cause. In turn, law's capacity to support advocacy for the
politically weak is closely related both to the autonomy of law-
measured in terms of factors such as judicial independence, the strength
of the bar, and the stability of social justice oriented practice sites-and
to the degree of political openness-measured in terms of the ability of
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dissidents to mobilize politically against a regime in power. These two
qualities are closely connected but also vary independently. Our
comparative framework employs these two factors as a starting point for
examining the specific features of the legal and political systems in each
country that influence legal mobilization for justice. As we have
emphasized, our analysis is intended to generate new insights, provoke
further discussion, and invite improvements.
To develop our country-specific analyses, we have drawn
heavily on the contributions of the authors in this issue. Their detailed
accounts have greatly enriched our analysis in an especially important
way by reminding us that legal and political context is not static, but
rather a picture in motion. Lawyers adapt political objectives, strategic
choices, and legal methods over time in an evolving political landscape
to pursue distinct paths of legal mobilization. Their work in this regard
can have an iterative effect on both the autonomy of law and political
openness. As the stories of these contributors reveal, lawyers often
mobilize law's power to create openings for political change, and then
leverage that political change to build greater autonomy of law. Of
course, our framework is intended not only to show how comparison can
illuminate the contextual reasons for differences in practice, but to invite
further comparative research and deeper analysis of the role of law in
development in Asia. We also think that comparison reveals a broader
lesson: that lawyers who mobilize law for social justice, though marginal
in numbers and status, often help to open new paths for change.
In the twenty-first century, law is widely viewed as an important
element in development. Some have suggested that legal institutions in
emerging societies will inevitably converge with institutions and
practices established in developed Western democracies. Yet, in spite of
wide differences in legal development, Asia has emerged as a region of
dynamic economic growth capable of having a powerful influence on
global change. The path of legal development in these societies seems
anything but uniform and predictable. Just as economic development
within the region has had few precedents, so the path of legal
development, and the part played by lawyers for social causes, has
responded to unique opportunities and limitations created by political
and social change accompanying development in each country. Although
influenced by the appeal of global rule of law ideals and the resources
offered by international donors, lawyers who mobilize law for social
justice in Asia are breaking new ground in societies unlike those of
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Europe or America by inventing new and creative roles for law that may
be especially meaningful in the new contexts created by a global world.
